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I. INTRODUCTION

When one thinks of patent law, one thinks of complicated
mechanical inventions, or increasingly, of inventions in genetic
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tions that highly skilled and educated persons spend years
articulating and perfecting.1 Some of these inventions, such as the
non-aerosol spray pump,2 are complicated in their design, but
straightforward in their application. Other inventions, such as
genetic inventions3 or inventions based on algorithms,4 can be

See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980)
(discussing the patentability of a genetically engineered organism); Martin v. Wyeth, Inc.,
193 F.2d 58, 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (4th Cir. 1951) (discussing the patentability of medical
and surgical procedures).
"Inre Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
3 See, eg., Diamond, 447 U.S. 303; Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (denying standing to farmers and animals rights
groups to challenge PTO's interpretive rule allowing non-naturally occurring organisms,
including animals, to be patentable); Ex ParteAllen 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 [Bd. Pat. App.
& Inter. 1987]) (affirming PTO rejection of a patent for the "always-edible oyster," while
affirming that the Chakrabarty rationale extends patent protection to artificially made life
forms).
For scholarship related to transgenic animals, see Hugo A. Delevie, Animal Patenting:
Probing the Limits of U.S. PatentLaws, 74 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 492 (1992)
(arguing that new animal life forms do not fit within 35 U.S.C. § 101, but may be patented
under 35 U.S.C. § 112); Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the
First Seventeen Years, Prospectiveon the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENy. U. L. REV. 127
(1991) (giving a historical perspective of biotechnology patent law and examining current
trends); John S. Hudson, Biotechnology Patents after the "HarvardMouse".• Did Congress
Really Intend Everything Under the Sun to Include Shiny Eyes, Soft Fur and Pink Feet?, 74
J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SoCY' 510 (1992) (reviewing concerns of and offering alternative
ways to patent living organisms); W. Lesser, Animal Variety Protection: A Proposal for a
U.S. Model Law, 75 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Socy 398 (1993) (discussing the legal
difficulties of patenting animals and offering a market based solution); Thomas Traian Moga,
TransgenicAnimals as Intellectual Property (orthe PatentedMouse that Roared), 76 J. PAT.
[& TRADEMARK] OFF. SocY 511 (1994) (examining the development of and objections to
patenting transgenic animals); Sean Johnston, Comment, Patent Protectionfor the Protein
Products of Recombinant DNA, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249 (1989) (examining the patenting
problems associated with second generation recombinant protein); Matthew B. Tropper,
Comment, Patentabilityof GeneticallyEngineered Life-Forms: Legal Issues and Solutions,
25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 119 (1991) (analyzing legal issues and potential solutions to
problems raised by genetic engineering).
' Algorithms themselves are not protectable. See, Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287 (1988) (offering a philosophical explanation for why
an intellectual property law system can justifiably deny legal protection to creators of
everyday ideas and extraordinary ideas-like an algorithm.). See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981) (allowing a mathematical formula to be patented
when it is part of a process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function that
patent law is designed to protect); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
673 (1972) (discussing policy implications behind the patentability of mathematical
formulae); Hans A. von Spakovsky et al., The Limited Patentingof Computer Programs: A
Proposed StatutoryApproach, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 27 (1985-1986) (reviewing the history of and
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complicated both in their design and in their application.
Yet another aspect of patent law concerns items that are simple
or straightforward in design, but complicated in their history-so
much so sometimes, that their historical complexity defies the
rationale behind granting patent protection in the first place. 5
Often, these items are so simple and straightforward that they are
not even referred to as "inventions."' Cups, plates, spoons, and
napkins are examples of things that fall within this category. Their
use punctuates our daily lives to such a degree that although they
were once novel additions to our cultural life, we now take them
entirely for granted.' Though the items referred to above are not

finding then-current computer program patent protection adequate); Kenneth C. Brooks,
Comment, Human Ingenuity: A Novel Standardfor PatentingAlgorithms, 22 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 455 (1992) (recommending that patent protection be extended to algorithms using
the "human ingenuity" standard applied in biotechnology patent law); Jeffrey A. Simenauer,
Note, Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A Criticism of the PTO's View on
Algorithms, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871 (1986) (criticizing the PTO's inclusion of all
algorithms in the public domain to the detriment of inventors seeking patents on computer
programs).
6 The historical reasons for granting monopolies based on patents are related to the
development of industry (in the early modern European context) and innovation (in the
nineteenth century American context). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early
Evolution of the United States PatentLaw: Antecedents (Part1), 76 J. PAT. C&TRADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y 697 (1994) [hereinafter Evolution (Part1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early
Evolution of the United States PatentLaw: Antecedents (Part2), 76 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y 849 (1994) [hereinafter Evolution (Part2)] (explaining origin and evolution of the
ideological theories behind patent law); Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in Historical
Perspective (Part 1), 75 J. PAT [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 689 (1993) [hereinafter Novelty
Part 1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in HistoricalPerspective (Part 2), 75 J. PAT [&
TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 777 (1993) [hereinafter Novelty (Part 2)] (explaining the basis for
the novelty requirement and its development in the U.S. and other countries).
6 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1994) defines "invention" as an "invention or discovery". But, since
the word "invention" is not capable of precise statutory definition, the courts have control
over its meaning. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (distinguishing between
an invention and a mere idea); Spero v. Ringold, 377 F.2d 652, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (defining invention as a mental act, known only to its originator, that has
meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art); United States Plywood Corp. v. General Plywood
Corp., 370 F.2d 500, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (6th Cir. 1966) (setting a constitutional standard
for invention as including innovation, advancement, and things that add to the sum of useful
knowledge); West Branch Novelty Co. v. Bloom, 31 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (noting that
the word invention is not susceptible to precise definition).
7See, e.g., NORBERT ELIAS, THE HISTORY OF MANNERS (THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: VOLUME
I), 53-59 (1978) (discussing De civilitate morum puerilium (On civility in children), a short
treatise written by Erasmus in 1530 for the education of boys of noble birth explaining the
proper use of then innovative items like plates, spoons, and other table implements).
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generic marks in the statutory, trademark sense of the word, they
are generic historical items.' They have a common, widespread,
descriptive function or use.
Nested within this subcategory of historically generic items is yet
another subcategory of items that ride the waves of historical time,
if not narrative. These items are like their continuously used
counterparts in that they were once novel inventions transformed
by widespread use into commonly accepted items of material
culture. But these items are different in that they have fallen out
of use from time to time, only to be "reinvented" or "rediscovered"
in different historical periods. An example of this kind of item is
the gusset, which is a diamond shaped piece of fabric that is
inserted between seams in clothing so as to give the wearer more
freedom of movement. Unlike the cup, plate, or spoon, the gusset
disappears and then reappears on the cultural landscape, thus
complicating the issue of its ownability.
Today we assume that everything is ownable.9 Yet, we also
know that there are compelling reasons why some things should
not be ownable, or more specifically, why they should not be
protected under copyright or patent law.'0 As one scholar put it,
8

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994) (allowing for cancellation of registration of generic marks).

Although "generic" is not defined in the current statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1063 previously provided
for cancellation when the registered mark became "the common descriptive name of an
article or substance." 15 U.S.C. § 1063(c) (1976). The work "generic" replaced this language
in 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-667 § 115(4), 102 Stat. 3935, 3940 (1988). At least one other legal
scholar has noticed this connection. See Hughes, supra note 4, at 320 (discussing how some
"common, everyday ideas are too generically useful to allow someone to monopolize them").
9 See, eg., Richard B. Schmitt, When NBA's Michael JordanJumps, PatentLawyers May
Do the Same, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1996, at B12D (stating the possibility that athletic moves
may be patentable).
"0There is fast growing literature on this point. For a representative sample of articles,
see Margreth Barrett, The 'Law of Ideas*Reconsidered,71 J. PAT [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOCY
691 (1989) (cautioning against overextending intellectual property law to undeveloped ideas);
Paul Goldstein, PreemptedState Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses:
Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (1977) (discussing the importance of
keeping federal copyright law within its "historically limited ambit"); Steven P. Handler,
Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of the
Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1971) (arguing against
extending copyright protection to mass-produced, commercial items on the ground that such
extension derogates on the public domain). Cf Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in
Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY USA 137 (1993) (noting that concern about overdesignating intellectual property rights reflects an inherent conservatism found in law
generally and is not something peculiar to intellectual property law).
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"the object ... of any ... property system, is simply to separate
those interests that the law will protect from those [that] it will
not, and to prescribe the levels and conditions of the protection
accorded."" Thus, in cases where there is concern with recognizing something as ownable, it is typically over ethical or political
issues of recognition, not over whether the thing in question is
conceptually designatable as property.
The classic case on point is Moore v. Regents of the University of
1 2 in which the California Supreme Court was asked to
California,
decide whether a cancer patient had a recognizable property
interest in the diseased spleen cells excised from his body and used
by researchers to develop a patented cell line. The Moore court
declined to recognize such an interest, preferring instead to leave
the issue to the legislature. 3 In the areas of copyright and patent
law, scholars have expressed similar concerns about ethical issues,
but they have articulated them within a well established framework allowing for broad ranging discussions about the Constitution-

al, political, systemic, and institutional implications of over
designating intellectual property rights. 4

" Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1108.
P.2d 479, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1753 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 496.
14See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: PrivateIntellectual

12 793
13

Property and the Public Domain Part 1, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1993) (noting the
effect of private intellectual property on the public domain); Barrett, supra note 10;
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects ofPropertyand Subjects ofPolitics: IntellectualPropertyLaws
and DemocraticDialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991) (discussing the political dimension of
the relationship between legal ownership and cultural authority); Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 158 (1982) (analyzing the relationship
between the trademark monopoly and basic First Amendment rights); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (discussing the tension
between copyright law and the First Amendment); Wendy J. Gordon, A PropertyRight in
Self-Expression:Equalityand Individualismin the NaturalLaw of IntellectualProperty, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that a properly conceived natural rights theory of intellectual
property would provide protection for free speech interests); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963)
(discussing the limits of copyright law in protecting facts); Melville B. Nimmer, Does
CopyrightAbridge the FirstAmendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1180 (1970) (arguing that the idea-expression line represents an important definitional
balance between copyright and free speech interests). Cf Samuels, supra note 10 (noting
that since law is by nature conservative about the creation of new causes of action,
scholarship about the political implications of extending property rights is too broad and
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With respect to the gusset, all of these broad concerns are
implicated. Like the spleen cells in Moore, the gusset does not fit
squarely within standard definitions of private property; nor does
it fit squarely within the statutory provisions of protectable
property set out by copyright and patent law.
Copyright law protects original design expression, not design
ideas.'5 The gusset is not protectable under copyright law because
it is essentially a design idea.'6 In its tangible form, the gusset is
no more than a diamond shaped piece of fabric that is incorporated
into an ordinary garment. 7 In its intangible form, it is no more
than an idea. But a representational, graphic design for a gusset
or even for a gusseted garment, like pants, is different than a

hence misses the point).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102. See, e.g., Condotti, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 139 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (making a distinction between a design expression, which is
copyrightable, and a design idea, which is not); cf. Handler, supra note 10 (criticizing the
ways in which courts have applied the idea-expression distinction).
" See infra Part II.A.
17

One-piece gusset

Two-piece gusset

NORMA R. HOLLEN, PATTERN MAKING BY THE FLAT-PATTERN METHOD 260 (6th ed. 1987).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/2

6

Carrillo: Protecting a Piece of American Folklore: The Example of the Gusse

1997]

AMERICAN FOLKLORE

209

graphic design for a Dior dress.'8 While the graphic design for
gusseted pants is an expression, it is an expression that only
slightly modifies two well known ideas-pants and the gusset.
Courts have been reluctant to find such slight modifications
sufficient grounds for granting a government monopoly in a
clothing design, even if that design meets the originality requirement of copyright law.' 9 On the other hand, a Dior dress design,
is original, and to the degree that it approaches haute couture, it
may even be considered art.2 °
While copyright law protects an original design expression,
21
patent law protects ornamentality in the case of design patents
or innovation in the case of utility patents.2 2 The gusset is neither
ornamental nor innovative.
Despite the imperfect fit between the gusset and copyright or
patent law, there are two clear but indirect ways to gain a legal
interest in an item like a gusset. The first way is to patent an
innovative garment that incorporates the gusset. 23 The second is
to perfect a trade dress in uniquely marketed, but non-innovative
gusseted garments. 24 This Article discusses the former method

m See, e.g., Dior v. Milton, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210 (N.Y. App. Div.
1956) (noting the protection of creative elements where skill, talent, and ingenuity are
employed).
19
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
20 Dresses are not copyrightable, but graphic dress designs may be if they constitute
original expressions. 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX5) (1994). See also Allan L. Schwartz, Fabricand
Dress Designs as Protected by Copyright Under Federal Copyright Act, 26 A.L.R. FED. 408
(1996) (distinguishing between the graphic "dress design" and the actual garment as
"design"); Cameron VKWehringer, Dress Designs:Time Protection and Copyrights, 40 J. PAT
[& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 816 (1958) (predicting that copyright protection may eventually
extend to actual garments as indicative of original design); Rocky Schmidt, Comment,
Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REv. 861 (1983)
(arguing for extension of copyright protection to actual garments on the ground that they are
the product and, therefore, the legal equivalent of graphic clothing design).
21 35 U.S.C. § 171. See also Perry J. Saidman & Mark B. Mondry, Sneakers, Design
Patents and Summary Judgments: Opening a New Era in the Protection of Consumer
ProductDesigns, 71 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Socy 524 (1989) (discussing the use of
design patents in athletic shoe sole design and manufacturing).
2 See infra notes 100-112 and accompanying text (discussing how courts define novelty).
23 See infra Part III.B.2.
24
Trade dress is a specific aspect of trademark law, which protects "identifying symbols".
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 8 (4th ed.
1996). Trade dress considerations, though important in this case, are outside the scope of
this paper.
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and leaves the latter for a later paper. Part II of this Article
analyzes the ownability of the gusset as a legal-historical matter.
Part III presents and assesses the question of how one private actor
tried to capture the gusset from the public domain. By referring to
the public domain or the "commons," this Article does not intend to
join the "public domain club," as one commentator has put it.2 So
while this Article places the gusset in the "public domain," or the
"commons," it does so on the presupposition that the gusset is an
item of (material) folklore, and it presents a historical record that
authenticates the gusset as such. By use of this record, the
example of the gusset is thus distinguished from the unsupported
examples typically offered to buttress the theory of the public
domain. 6
The various contextualizing sources cited in this Article add to
ongoing discussions in the field, especially on the topic of the public
domain. Commentaries regarding the public domain are noted and
sometimes described in this Article. However, these commentaries
offer abstractions, not specific examples, other than those recorded
in appellate case reporters,2 7 and they tend to overemphasize the
role of courts and bureaucracies and underemphasize the role of
free agent citizens in marking out the public domain. For instance,
one commentator wrote that it "took a twentieth-century decision
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to make clear this story
[Romeo and Juliet] could not be owned."' This Article takes a
different tack. It operates on the premise that writers do not
consult appellate court opinions before writing their inspired
version of Romeo and Juliet. It also asserts that in order to
understand why or how something is or becomes non-ownable, one
must look at a broader range of evidence than reported court
opinions provide.
Thus, this Article considers the gusset in detail with the hope of
offering one possible model for thinking about vexing problems such
as the idea/expression distinction and the existence of the public

Samuels, supra note 10, at 147 (discussing Gordon, supra note 14).
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 1568-70 (offering examples that turn on, for
example, Roman numerals, scriptures, undescribed advertising images, and the ego-idsuperego structure; none of the examples are backed up by empirical or historical evidence).
See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 14.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1557.
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domain. It uses standard legal sources such as statutes, cases, and
congressional reports; but it also relies on original historical
sources of the sort found in corporate archives, patents, and Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) records-particularly patent fie
wrappers and litigation files. Hence, the discussion is based upon
a history of pants and the gusset. It attempts to contextualize the
discussion of broad, abstract issues in the life of a common
item-the gusset.
Finally, the title of this Article uses the word "protection." Its
thesis is that the gusset is not and should not now become privately
ownable. Therein lies the gusset's survival as folklore. That is, by
using the word "protect," this Article does not mean to imply that
the gusset should become subject to private ownership. To the
contrary, use of the word "protect" means that the gusset-like
other items of American folklore 29 -ought to remain freely available to all. The gusset is more than a mere clothing design. It has
a long, global history; over the years it has established itself in
American folklore. Although this Article focuses on the gusset's
American embodiment, it invokes broader issues as well-issues
related to the protection of folklore generally. These issues are the
importance of oral and unofficial histories in some intellectual
property determinations, the role of a bureaucracy like the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) in protecting folklore by declining to
grant encroaching patents, and the importance of folklore to even
a highly technological society such as ours.
II. OWNABILITY

Simple, straightforward items pose special problems in intellectual property law. 0 They are typically not copyrightable nor
patentable because their origin extends far beyond any individual
actor. When an item's use extends across historical periods, the
quality of being "remembered" and "forgotten" further complicates
the issue of ownership.

See infra note 191 (defining folklore).
See, e.g., Leslie Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright,47 U.
MIAI L. REv. 1221 (1993) (arguing that simple, generic ideas are more difficult to protect
under copyright law than complex, specific ideas); Hughes, supra note 4.
2

30

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2

212

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 4:203

Because ownability is the norm in our system, tracking the way
in which a particular item or idea comes to be recognized as nonownable is instructive in its own right.3 It reveals a boundary
that exists between the category of things and ideas we allow to be
privately exploited and the category of things and ideas that we
regard as non-exploitable, less-exploitable, or exploitable only
within preset limits.3 2 Things that rest upon or near the bound-

ary-like the excised cell in Moore' -raise concerns because of
the ease with which they can be conceived of as "ownable" and the
worry over what consequences will ensue if they are.3' Under our
system, if something is distinguishable and can be separated from
the common stock, it is more easily conceptualized as privately
ownable property.35 Thus, in Moore, while the common stock raw
cell was initially presumed unownable, it became ownable once
researchers transformed it into a manufacturable cell-line.36

31

But see Samuels, supra note 10 (arguing that there is no such thing as the "public

domain" in copyright law; private ownability is the firm norm, but there are some limitations
on the rights that flow from private ownership, limitations such as those articulated in the
fair use doctrine).
' See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14 (discussing Lockean notions of rights and duties related
to the exploitation of property).
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
See, eg., John J. O'Connor, Note, The CommercializationofHuman Tissue--the Source
of Legal, Ethical and Social Problems: An Area Better Suited to Legislative Resolution, 24
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 115 (1990) (analyzing legal aspects of using human tissue in commercial
contexts).
' See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 14 (using the methodology of case analysis to support an
explanation of this phenomenon in terms of "author reasoning").
N Moore, 793 P.2d 479. For discussions of Moore, see Aoki, supra note 14, at 29
(discussing whether cells drawn from patient tissue should be patentable); Michelle
Bourianoff Bray, Note, PersonalizingPersonalty:Toward a PropertyRight in Human Bodies,
69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 233-39 (1990) (criticizing Moore's failure to affirmatively delineate
whether an individual has a property interest in his body); Brian G. Hannemann, Comment,
Body Partsand Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 S.W.U. L. REV. 399,
406-07 (1993) (criticizing Moore's failure to resolve the debate over the existence of a
property interest in one's body).
This issue has arisen in other contexts involving indigenous persons and pharmaceutical
companies. For recent scholarship on this issue, see Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics:
The InternationalLegal Regime ConcerningBiotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. IN'L
ENVTL. L. & POLY 111 (1996) (analyzing the growth of biotechnology and the contemporaneous loss of biodiversity); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the
ProtectionofIntellectualPropertyRights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993) (discussing the
difficulties of creating property rights in new technologies such as pharmaceuticals); Mark
Hanning, An Examination of the Possibility to Secure Intellectual Property Rights for Plant
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Additionally, while treating the raw cell as private property raised
ethical concerns, treating the manufactured cell-line as property did
not.17 These ethical concerns were first expressed with language
about the "imperfect fit" between the raw cell and the property law
system, and later, in more theoretically minded discussions, with
language about the ethical and philosophical consequences of
treating the raw cell like private property. 8 Thus, tracking the
ways in which something becomes ownable or non-ownable by
individuals brings a boundary line to the fore. It also helps to
articulate why common stock property (tangible or intangible) is
not considered ownable by individuals, and more specifically, why
it should not be. Part II of this Article analyzes this problem in
relation to the gusset.
The gusset offers a clear view of the gossamer analytical threads
that determine what becomes privately ownable and what does not.
This may be because the gusset does not carry the same emotive or
ethical charge that body cells, transgenic animals, or sports moves
carry. With this in mind, Part II analyzes how the gusset is
neither ownable under copyright law nor under patent law.
A. THE GUSSET'S OWNABILITY UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW

Actual garments are not copyrightable as embodied designs.
While 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) defines copyrightable "writings" as
"original works of authorship,"3 9 a phrase that includes within its

Genetic Resources Developed by Indigenous Peoples of the NAFTA States: Domestic
Legislation Under the InternationalConventionfor ProtectionofNew Plant Varieties, 13 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 175 (1996) (examining intellectual property rights in plant DNA).
' But see Joseph William Singer, PublicityRights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court
Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 18 n.31 (1996) (registering
disapproval with the Moore court's refusal to grant the patient a property interest in his
cell).
' See, e.g., Nancy E. Field, Note, Evolving ConceptualizationsofProperty:A Proposal to
De-Commercialize the Value of Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE L.J. 169 (1989) (arguing against
recognition of a commercial property interest in fetal tissue); Sharon Nan Perley, Note, From
Control Over One's Body to Control Over One's Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335 (1992) (arguing for an extension of property rights
in one's body to include body parts, such as excised tissue and cells, and for an extension of
the law of informed consent so that the patient may determine what happens to these parts).
3 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
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scope "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,"4° 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) limits this definition by stating that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection ... extend to any idea ... [or] concept,"
regardless of the form in which the idea or concept is "embodied." ' Thus, with respect to garments, the Copyright Act draws
a distinction between actual garments, which are uncopyrightable

public domain items, and graphic garment designs, which may be
copyrightable expressions. 42 The House Report on the Copyright

Act further clarifies this statutory distinction between embodied
design-the garment-and graphic design-the drawing of the
garment-by classifying "ladies' dresses" under the rule in Mazer
v. Stein'a as uncopyrightable "industrial designs," not as copyrightable "applied arts."'4 This classification presupposes that
4

oId. § 102(aX5).
Id. § 102(b). For a discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy doctrine, see Judge
Learned Hand's comments in Peter Pan Fabrics,Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154 (2d Cir. 1960) (discussing the difficulty in drawing a doctrinal
distinction between idea and expression); and in Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing the importance of applying the idea-expression dichotomy
doctrine in light of its abstract purpose of striking a balance between competition and
protection).
. 42 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
See also Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., 891
F.2d 452, 455-56, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1296 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that clothes are useful
articles and hence not copyrightable, even if they are (mis)described as "soft sculptures");
Aldridge v. Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that clothes, as useful
articles, are not copyrightable); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc. 112 F. Supp.
187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (holding that a copyright on a graphic dress design gave the copyright
holder the right to a monopoly over the drawing, but not over the actual garment); Raenore
Novelties, Inc. v. Superb Stitching Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding
that functional, utilitarian garment parts, such as placket closures, are not copyrightable
under federal law nor otherwise protectable under state unfair competition laws).
Just as garments are outside the scope of the copyright laws, so are garment patterns
(markers). See, e.g, Beverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.), Inc. v. Morris, 126 F.R.D. 33, 37-38,
11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that garment patterns--as opposed to
design drawings-are "functional products not eligible for copyright protection" since they
are "template type tools for use in the manufacturing process of making clothing"); Kemp &
Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch, 34 F.2d 291, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding that neither actual
garments nor garment patterns present copyrightable subject matter).
Proposed amendments to the Copyright Act have repeatedly attempted to exclude from
copyright protection designs "composed of three-dimensional features of shape and surface
with respect to men's, women's, and children's apparel, including undergarments and
outerwear." H.R. 2985, 98th Cong., § 902(e) (1983); H.R. 2706, 96th Cong., § 902(e) (1979).
41

43

347 U.S. 201 (1954).

" H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54-55 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667-68
(citing Mazer, 347 U.S. 201). For an example of cases distinguishing between copyright
protection and design patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 171 see the White v. Lombardy
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even if the actual garments themselves are not copyrightable, the
graphic designs for such garments could be, provided, of course,
they first meet the originality requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 102.4
If a graphic design is also "useful," as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101,
then copyright protection will be limited. It will extend only to
those "pictorial, graphic or sculptural" features of the design that
can be "identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of [its] utilitarian aspects."4 6 This requirement of
separability has proven difficult to apply in cases of embodied
clothing designs, since clothes are by their nature useful items.
Dresses, Inc. line of cases, 40 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (invalidating a patent for dress
design for want of invention); and 40 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (invalidating a patent for
a dress design on the theory that combining old elements to come up with something new
is not an invention for patent purposes).
' See Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 180 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 545 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that only a "minimal quantum" of originality is required);
Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 506 (2d Cir. 1960)
(holding that a 'modest requirement" of originality is needed).
"[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from,
and are capable ofexisting independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994). See also Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that the separability test only applies to articles that are first deemed "useful"
under 17 U.S.C. § 101).
47 A test for determining separability that is based on the designer's creative process
rather than on the physical nature of the item in question has been proposed by Robert C.
Denicola. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and IndustrialDesign: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707 (1983). See Brandir Intl Inc. v. Cascade
Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting the Denicola test for the Second
Circuit); Nat'l Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D. Cal.
1988) (adopting the Denicola test in the Ninth Circuit "to the extent it requires one to look
to an artist or designer's creative process, and the decisions going into that process, in
creating a useful article").
For criticisms of the Denicola test, see Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1987) (noting concern with the "practicality, of the Denicola test
because it leaves "too much room for self serving declarations of aesthetic aims"); Shira
Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.SA. 339, 372-75 (1990) (arguing that the Denicola test's reliance on the
creative process can be found nowhere in statutory language, legislative history, or judicial
interpretation); Raymond M. Polakovic, Should the Bauhausbe in the CopyrightDoghouse?
Rethinking Conceptual Separability, 64 U. Cow. L. REV. 871 (1993) (arguing that the
Denicola test is the same as requiring courts to differentiate between "art" and "not art");
Malla Pollack, A Rose is a Rose is a Rose-But is a Costume a Dress? An Alternative
Solution in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 1, 10-18
(1993) (discussing the limitations of conceptual separability tests-including Deniola's-in
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For instance, in a case involving belt buckles, one trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the alleged defendantinfringer on the ground that although a belt buckle may be
decorative, it is neither jewelry, which is copyrightable, 4 nor the
proper subject matter of copyright law under the separability test.
The court reasoned that a belt buckle's intrinsic function is
utilitarian,49 and therefore, its decorative aspects cannot exist on
their own.5° Likewise, in a case involving a modification of a
milliner's hat design, the court noted that while the design was
original in the abstract sense of the word, the design was too slight
a modification of a public domain item-the idea of the hat-to be
the proper subject matter of copyright protection."1 In both cases,
these courts struggled with deciding where the potentially protectable design ended and the unprotectable utilitarian item began.
Even in a situation where a design is original and more obviously
artistically separable from the utilitarian article than the above
courts regarded the belt and hat designs, the intent of Congress is
still to offer only limited protection to the designer."2 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl Inc., the belt design case noted
above, the Second Circuit overturned the lower court's grant of
summary judgment while still noting that, as a general matter,

the area of costume designs).
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
" Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732, 735, 206 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 439 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 632 F.2d 989, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Animal
Fair, Inc. v. AMFESCO Indus., Inc. 620 F. Supp. 175 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding that the
exterior design of bear paw slippers is separable and thus copyrightable), affd mem., 794
F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986). The fact that the lower court's decision in Kieselstein-Cord was
reversed on appeal remains consistent with the illustration offered above. See infra notes
53-61 and accompanying text.
oKieselstein-Cord,489 F. Supp. at 736 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 and 37 C.F.R. § 202.10
(1977) the applicable regulation at the time of the belt buckles' creation).
'1 Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. F.T.C., 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940), affd, 312
U.S. 469 (1941).
52 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 50-51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663-64. See also Denicola, supra note 47 (discussing the legislative
history behind offering only limited protection for useful articles); J.H. Reichman, Design
Protection in Domestic and ForeignCopyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the
Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143 (1983); Handler, supra note 10 (arguing that
although Congress intended to protect only those designs that have independently existing
artistic merit, courts have inappropriately overextended protection to mass-produced, three
dimensional items by misapplying the idea-expression distinction).
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"the basic requirements of originality and creativity... would take
the vast majority of belt buckles wholly out of copyrightability."'
The appellate court's operative presumption was that most belt
buckles are not original enough to be copyrightable, a presumption
that also motivated the trial court's decision. Thus, the two
opinions were doctrinally consistent despite opposite results.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found Kieselstein-Cord's buckle
designs copyrightable, but only after the appellant-designer had
successfully rebutted the presumption of ordinariness. Hence, the
basic presumption of non-copyrightability remained the rule;
moreover, as the Second Circuit conceded, the presumption would
still decide most cases. The Second Circuit's main disagreement
with the lower court, however, was over whether the presumption
had been rebutted under the facts.54
While the belt designs in question were ultimately granted
protection, the Second Circuit's holding in Kieselstein-Cordremains
consistent with the general presumption against extending
copyright protection to embodied clothing design. The justification
for denial of protection to embodied garments is that an actual
garment's artistic merits are typically indistinguishable from its
utility.5 5 Thus, what distinguished Kieselstein-Cord's "Winchester" and "Vaquero" belt buckles from other non-copyrightable
buckles was not that they were like embodied designer garments,
or even embodied haute couture garments, which are not copyrightable once they are marketed, but rather that at least two of the
three judges on the Second Circuit were convinced that the buckles
were also "works of art" as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 102 and its
corresponding regulations. 6 Specifically, two of the three sitting
judges likened the particular buckle designs to copyrightable
sculptured and artistic items of jewelry, rather than to mere belt
buckles, which are not copyrightable.5 7
In addition, the appellate court noted that the case was "on a
razor's edge of copyright law,"8 suggesting that the problem was

53 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994.
5

4

id.

55See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
'Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 992.
57 Id. at 994.
58 Id. at 990.
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ultimately one of line-drawing. But the court's actual analysis was
more contextualizing than a mere line-drawing approach would
allow. The issue for the court was whether the belt buckles rose to
the level of art; the answer to that question was based on a blend
of factors, most of which were analytically detectable only in
hindsight. From the designs' inception, the designer had labeled
the buckles "sculpture."59 However, since the designer's own
designation ought not solely determine whether something rises to
the level of a "work of art" under the copyright regulations,"
additional evidence was required. The designer responded by
showing that the belts were expensive, ranging from $147.50 to
$6,000 wholesale, that consumers used them as "necklaces" rather
than as mere belt buckles, that the designer had gained critical
acclaim, and finally, that the designer's post-litigation gift of two
belt buckles to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for its permanent
collection was accepted. 61 Together these factors illustrated that
the designer believed his work was art and that his belief was
affirmed by at least two distinct communities, consumers and
fashion critics. Had this evidence of belief bolstered by affirmation
not been introduced, Kieselstein-Cord's designs would have been
treated as ordinary, but expensive, belt buckles, and the design,
because it was inseparable from the functional buckle, would have
remained outside the scope of copyrightability, as embodied
clothing designs are generally.
Alternatively, had the belt design been something "printed on or
applied" to the metal, as opposed to inherent in the metal belt
buckle itself, then the two-dimensional design drawing would have
been protectable6 2 In cases where designs are printed or applied
to the useful items, the copyright monopoly is allowed. But the
protection extends exclusively to the artistically separable element
of the article (i.e., the design), not to its over-all configuration. 3

Id. at 991.
' See Registration to Claims of Copyright: Pictoral, Graphic, and Sculptural Works, 37
C.F.R. § 202.10 (1996) (noting that registratability is not "affected by the intention of the
author as to the use of the work").
61 Kieselstein-Cord,632 F.2d at 991.
62 H.R. REP. No. 97-1476, at 54-55 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663-64;
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1996).
63 H.R. REP. No. 97-1476, at 54-55.
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Under this rule, a portrait engraving of Beethoven, Bach, and
Brahms silkscreened on a sweatshirt was held to be the proper
subject matter of copyright law, while the idea of a sweatshirt was
not." The design of the composers was viewed as conceptually
separable from the t-shirt, and therefore subject to independent
copyright analysis and protection.0
Because of the analytical difficulty posed by the separability test,
analogies between clothing works and architectural works have
been drawn as clarification. These proposals are primarily based
on pre-Berne Convention domestic legislation,' though the postBerne Architectural Works Protection Act (AWPA) arguably also
serves to clarify, rather than compromise the analogy.67 Proponents argue that clothing works ought to be treated like architectural works. The parallel is seen as apt since the phrase "architectural works" is statutorily defined to encompass a building
embodied in "any tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans, or drawings." 68 Before 1990, the
copyright statute expressly protected "diagrams, models, and
technical drawings, including architectural plans,"6 9 but it only
implicitly protected structures (buildings), and then only those
elements that were conceptually separable from the structure's
utilitarian function.70 The AWPA, on the other hand, explicitly
extends protection to structures, 71 regardless of whether they meet

Eagle-Freedman-Roedelheim Co. v. Allison Mfg. Co., 204 F. Supp. 679, 133 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 357 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

Ild.
"Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
6'Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104
Stat. 5133 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 106, 120, 301 (1994)). For a work
proposing this analogy, see Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws
Applied to FashionWorks: Renewing the Proposalfor FoldingFashionWorks into the United
States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX.INT'L L.J. 341 (1991) (proposing that fashion works, like

architectural works, be given protection under the Copyright Act). See also Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (describing an industry
practice meant to deter design piracy in the marketplace), affd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
617 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
"17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
70
Id.§ 102.
71 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX8) (1994); id. § 101 (providing that the term architectural work
"includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements in the design").
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the separability test.72 However, it just as explicitly excludes from
protection "individual standard features" of the otherwise protected
structure. 73 The House Report justified this change by noting that
"architecture is not unlike poetry," and therefore, "the design of a
work of architecture is a 'writing' under the Constitution and fully
deserves protection under the Copyright Act."74
Proponents of the comparison argue that if this broad definitional
protection clarified the law of architectural works, it could work
equally well to clarify the law of fashion or garment works.75
However, in order to usher in the legal change, garment works first
would have to be re-defined as encompassing any tangible medium
of expression, including drawings, patterns, and actual garments.76
While architectural plans, drawings, and now, post-1990
structures are clearly copyrightable,77 standard common aspects
of these works are not. In any case, under either the previous or
the current rule, protection covers the graphic plan, maybe even the
physical structure, but stops short of protecting ordinary, "individual standard features."78 Proponents agree that this limitation
makes analogizing the law of garment works to the law of architectural works a modest proposal, one in line with Congress's original
intent to offer limited protection in special areas that border art
and industry. Under the proposed change, garment designs, as
"garment works," would be copyrightable; protection of embodied

72 H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 21 (1990).
73 17 U.S.C. § 101.

74 H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 12-13 (1990). See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(dX2) (1996)
(excluding from registrability "standard configurations of spaces, and individual standard
features, such as windows, doors, and other staple building components').
76
See, e.g., Hagin, supra note 67 (proposing that garment works, like architectural works
deserve protection); Schmidt, supra note 20 (stating that protection of garment designs would
produce the same benefits as protecting architectural works). Cf Deborah Squiers,
Copyright Claims Rejected for Exercise Clothes Patterns, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1989, at 1
(describing a case in which this analogy was proposed but rejected by the judge as "off the
mark").
76 Clothing is currently included in the definition of a "useful article" under 17 U.S.C. §
101.
77 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX8) (1994). Structures that were built before the passage of the
AWPA (1990) are still subject to the separability test.
7S37 C.F.R. § 202.11(dX2) (excluding "staple building components" from registrability).
See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "architectural work").
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designs would be the norm, but extended protection would not cover
"individual standard aspects" of any garment. Thus, garments of
haute couture and belt buckles that rise to the level of sculptured,
critically acclaimed "works of art" would be protected, whereas
"individual standard features" of the garment, presumably trouser
legs, belt loops, and the like, would remain open for all to use.79
Spiral sleeves might give rise to the new "razor's edge" in copyright
law, but neoprene waders s° or improved styles of industrial
clothing, for example, might be protected under either copyright
law, depending upon their originality, or under patent law,
depending upon their novelty.
On its face, this proposal, though seemingly emulating the
Architectural Works Protection Act, may be no more than an
embrace of the appellate court's rationale in Kieselstein-Cord.8 '
Under its terms, only uniquely designed garments would receive
extended protection, whereas the vast majority of typically
functional garments, like pants, would not. Pants would continue
to be treated as they are under the current rule on garments-as
outside the scope of copyright law either because of their utilitarian
and functional quality 2 (the separability rationale); the lack of
artistic awareness in the process by which they are created (the
Denicola test);" or because they are made up entirely of individual standard features (the Architectural Works Protection Act limitation)."
Despite its apparent workability, analogizing garment works to
architectural works has been criticized on three broad grounds.
The first criticism is based upon procedural grounds related to the
feasibility of giving notice of copyright on garments.' The second

, See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 20 (proposing a special copyright for garment designs,
limited in scope and term, with its own enforcement and royalty provisions).
80 See infra note 206 (citing a patent issued for neoprene waders having a seamless

crotch).
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing differing treatment of actual
garment and graphic garment designs).
"3 See supra note 47 (discussing the Denicola test for determining separability).
s See supra notes 67-73.
s Early copyright acts set out formalities that were prerequisites to federal protection.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909) (requiring publication with notice). The 1976 Act eliminated
those requirements, by extending protection to the point of creation, when the creation was
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). Notice requirements are no longer mandatory, effective March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention Implementa8'

82
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criticism, based on pre-AWPA law, cites substantive grounds
related to applying the tests of originality and the idea-expression
distinction to garments, which by their nature are consistently
more "standard" than buildings. This criticism applies in a postAWPA context as well, but there the terms of the debate would
center around the meaning of the phrase "individual standard
features." The issue, as conceptualized in Kieselstein-Cord,would
be argued as a straightforward matter of whether an individual
clothing designer could successfully rebut the presumption of
ordinariness by introducing evidence of critical acclaim." If this
latter approach were allowed, the fear is that courts would then be
forced to draw legal distinctions between high and low (or ordinary)
fashion on the theory that they could extend copyright protection
to the haute couture garment, but not to the vast majority of
ordinary garments. The third criticism cites policy grounds related
to free trade. 7
While these criticisms of the analogy offer compelling arguments
against its application, the garment/architectural works analogy,
even if applied in this context, would not justify the extension of
copyright protection to gusseted garments. This is particularly true
with respect to gusseted lower-body garments (pants), whether in
graphic or embodied form. First, gusseted pants, like the milliner's
hat and the sweatshirt, are already in the public domain and are
therefore outside the scope of copyright law."
Hence, such
garments are not now protectable on the basis of their unorigin-

tion Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 17 U.S.C.).
significance.

Thus this concern, theoretically, should no longer carry legal

fSSee supranotes 52-57 (discussing rebuttable presumption of ordinariness in Kieselstein-

Cord).
See, e.g., Handler, supra note 10 (discussing all three criticisms).
ssSee, e.g., Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942) (holding
that, in the absence of unfair competition, defendant had the right to copy a wedding dress
design and attach plaintiff-designers name to the pattern, since once it is offered for sale the
design became part of public domain); Samuel Winston, Inc. v. Charles James Servs., Inc.,
159 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718, 111 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (holding that actual,
three dimensional designs and fashions, "once displayed or sold, are forthwith relegated to
the realm of public domain, available to all who care to adopt them, with accompanying
forfeiture of any claim against the copyists"). For an analysis of the difficulties of
determining when a garment is published for public domain purpose, see Wehringer, supra

note 20.
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ality. Second, in the unlikely event that the gusset were to be

considered an original "application" to the public domain pant
garment,' the gusset has no separable pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural qualities,' since it is an intrinsically functional and
often hidden aspect of a garment.9 This means that the gusset
would not be copyrightable under the current separability test
primarily because it has no life, and certainly no poetic life,
independent of the garment that lends it context. Third, even if
clothing works were to be treated like architectural works,
copyright protection would not be available to most gusseted
garments (like gusseted pants) since they are arguably made up
entirely of common "standard features."9 2 In other words, the
gusset is as ordinary as the vast majority of belt buckles, pant legs,
shirt sleeves, window frames, or door knobs, albeit oddly so. It
would not be eligible for copyright protection even in the unlikely
event that Congress decided to categorically treat fashion designs
or works as it treats architectural works. Moreover, the gusset
should not be eligible for copyright protection since protecting, and
thus privatizing, the gusset would not further explicitly stated
Constitutional goals of "stimulat[ing] excellence in design, [and]
thereby enriching our public environment."9 3
In conclusion, while one may analogize between architectural
works and garment works, the two are substantially different in
See, e.g., Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. F.T.C., 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940)
(holding that what passes in the trade for an original hat or dress design cannot be
copyrighted since an "original" creation in these industries is "too slight a modification of a
known idea to justify the grant by the government of a monopoly to the creator"), affd, 312
U.S. 469 (1941); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 157
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that a flower corsage that duplicated an
arrangement commonly used in the flower industry was not "original" and, therefore, not
copyrightable).
* The lack of these qualities is to be contrasted with "selected works of architecture[-]those containing elements physically or conceptually separable from their utilitarian
function." H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 11 (1990).
91 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing and illustrating early patents incorporating the
gusset).
9Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 702(a), 104 Stat.
5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)) (excluding "individual standard features" from the
definition of an architectural work). See also, Telephone Interview with Victoria Garrison,
Pattern Maker (Aug. 14, 1996) (noting, in a way consistent with AWPA language, that the
gusset is defined in her field as a piece of fabric inserted into a body of fabric; the diamond
shaped gusset is far and away considered the standard shape of a gusset).
9H.R.
REP. No. 101-735, at 13 (1990).
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the practical sense that most garments are more akin to uncopyrightable functional buildings like photo-developing kiosks9 4 than
they are to clearly copyrightable monuments.95 This is especially
true of gusseted garments. More generally, however, courts have
repeatedly held that garment designs, whether they be designer
dresses or discount jeans, become public domain items once they
are offered for sale to the public. 6 They are not like "jewelry" and
hence do not implicate the Kieselstein-Cord approach that allows
designers to rebut the presumption of ordinariness in the name of
art. At the moment of sale, garment designs presumptively become
part of the vast majority of common stock garments, such as belt
buckles, shoes, and the like, and there they remain.
Therefore, although treating garment works like architectural
works would serve the legitimate purpose of giving designers who
use gussets some control over their work, this monopoly would
come at a high social cost. First, it would not advance the abstract
Constitutional goals of promoting design excellence, or even
democracy. Second, extending copyright protection to embodied
gusseted garments would complicate notice requirements since
practically (though not legally), garments would have to be visibly
marked with copyright notification in order to easily impart
information to potential licensees.9" Third, it would put courts in
the position of deciding which common (embodied) clothing designs
are "original" enough to emerge from the pool of common stock
designs, or alternatively, which aspects can be designated as
something above the standard ordinary aspects of the garment.
Relatedly, it would leave it for courts to decide what evidence is

"Although not held copyrightable on utilitarian grounds, certain design-related aspects
of these sorts of commercial buildings are protectable under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (1994). See, e.g., Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 128
(D. Kan. 1977) (holding that the non-functional aspects of a kiosk were protectable in a case
where there was persuasive evidence linking public confusion with the "distinctive,"
"arbitrary," "design-related" aspects of the kiosk); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977) (refusing to preliminarily enjoin defendant's use of a kiosk
structure on the ground that the kiosk was functional, and thus not protectable as
intellectual property). It is important to note that these cases predate the 1990 Architectural
Works Protection Act.
"See, e.g., Polakovic, supra note 47 (offering the example of the York Cathedral).
"See, e.g., Samuel Winston, Inc. v. Charles James Servs., 159 N.Y.S.2d 716 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1956) (holding that actual fashions put on sale enter the public domain).
97 See supra note 85.
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This, of
sufficient to rebut the presumption of ordinariness."
course, would force courts into a position they typically resist-deciding the difference between art and industry."
B.

THE GUSSET'S OWNABILITY UNDER PATENT LAW

As discussed above, the gusset is not ownable under copyright
law because it does not meet either the low originality requirement
or the severability requirement. Nor is the gusset innovative
enough, on its own, to justify the issuance of a monopoly under
patent law."° 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires that items be novel before
a patent monopoly will issue.'0 ' Novelty has not been statutorily
defined except in the most general of terms-a "novel" invention is
a "new and useful" one-making novelty a concept whose particulars are decided by courts. 0 2 But while words like "novelty" and,
by corollary, "invention" give courts a wide grant of power to forge
socially relevant and context-dependent definitions, 35 U.S.C. § 102
sets a firm statutory boundary by drawing a bright line between
privately ownable property, as signified by novelty, and alreadyowned or public domain property, as signified by the absence of
novelty. Under this provision, a novel invention is one that was not
previously "known or used by others in this country," or "patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,"
or otherwise in the public domain.'0 3 A novel invention is one
that has not been previously described in prior art. 04
But even where there is no identical, or in the case of clothing
designs, salient0 5 prior art to block the issuance of a utility pat-

See, e.g., Trifari, Krussman & Fishel v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 107 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 48 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) (refusing to decide whether the jewelry in question is "junk" or
'art').
Id. at 553.
'0o35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (setting out conditions of patentability and novelty).
101Id.
'1Id.
103Id.

'04Id. See also White v. Lombardy Dresses, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(modifying the requirement that prior art read identically on the invention by holding that
in the case of a common clothing design only the "the salient elements" of the design need
read 0on to block the issuance of a patent).
'5Lombardy Dresses, 40 F. Supp. at 550-51.
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ent, there is yet another test for determining whether the novelty
criteria has been met-the test of obviousness." e Patent law
requires a higher degree of originality than copyright law, so the
absence of prior art alone is not enough to justify the grant of a
utility patent monopoly;0 7 an invention must also be non-obvious
to a person with knowledge of the field."° A comparison between
patent and copyright law helps to illustrate the point. An "obvious"
invention is not novel enough to be patented even if it has no prior
art, whereas an expression may be copyrightable even if there are
a multitude of related, nearly identical expressions that are already

protected.' °9
The "knowledge of those with ordinary skill in the art" test
makes apparent that the obviousness test, or as it is sometimes
cast, the non-obviousness test, is a socially dependent, fact-based,
contextualizing method
to determine if an invention is "new," if not
"new and useful."110 A "new" invention is one for which there is
no prior art, and one that "person[s] having ordinary skill in the
art" have not anticipated, despite consistent familiarity with the
art, its requirements, or its deficiencies and possibilities."1
A
new invention is one that emerges because of a surge of intellectual
activity and attention on the part of the person who deserves the

10635 U.S.C. § 103.
1

7 Id. § 154.

'08 Id. § 103.
109 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) ("The novelty of the art or thing
described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright*); Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L.J. 965 (1990) (discussing Baker v. Selden and its progeny
via A
vis the idea of the public domain).
110
See Hughes, supra note 4 (discussing whether "non-obviousness," which requires that
there be an "advance" over existing technology, also implicitly requires that there be "new
value" in the item; and arguing that there is an implicit "value added" requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 103). See also James Otieno-Odek, Public Domain in PatentabilityAfter the
UruguayRound: A DevelopingCountry'sPerspective with Specific Reference to Kenya, 4 TUL.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 15, 27 (noting that the GATT TRIPs Agreement adds a value added
requirement by providing that "patents shall be available for any inventions whether
products or processes in all fields of technology provided they are new, involve an inventive
step, and are industrially applicable" quoting GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), (Apr. 15, 1994), art. 27(1)). Cf. 2 PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §§ 8.03, 8.06 (1996) (noting that as a general rule,
there is no implicit value added requirement for 35 U.S.C. § 101, though there are strict
utility requirements in specialized areas, such as the patenting of chemical compounds).
. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/2

24

Carrillo: Protecting a Piece of American Folklore: The Example of the Gusse

1997]

AMERICAN FOLKLORE

227

title "inventor"-a surge that is welcomed by others in the field.
Since prior art and knowledge in the field determine whether an
invention will be considered novel for patent purposes, the gusset's
origins, both European and American, are relevant to the question
of its patentability under United States law. Unfortunately,
evidence of the gusset's prior historic use is more oral than written.
Although the gusset has been used around the world, particularly
in Europe for at least half a millennium, there is little documentary
evidence of its longstanding use. 112 Documentary evidence about
the gusset does exist, however, for late nineteenth and twentieth
century America. From evidence found in museums, corporate
archives, and in United States Patent and Trademark Office
records, it is apparent that the gusset has been consistently defined
first, as a functional item, and second, as a common stock or public
domain item. But while the gusset is in the public domain, it has
been incorporated into patented garments, thus creating some
question about its status as privately ownable property. The next
section analyzes this apparent contradiction by examining two
related themes. The first theme is how the gusset has come to be
defined as a matter of prior art. The second theme is whether, in
light of the gusset's historical definition, it has been treated as
privately ownable under patent law.
C. PRIOR USE-DEFINING THE GUSSET FOR PATENT LAW PURPOSES

The gusset, as a descriptive word, came into use as early as
1412.113 Suits of armor used gussets to allow for movement and
ventilation. 114 Medieval clothing typically used the gusset for
reasons related to the then rudimentary field of pattern making.1 1 5 In this use, the gusset served as a decorative way to add
11 Telephone Interview with Melissa Leventon, Textile Curator, The M.H. deYoung
Museum (June 8, 1996).

113THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 966 (2d ed. 1989). See, e.g., NORMA R. HOLLEN,

PATrERN MAKING BY THE FLAT-PATTERN METHOD (6th ed. 1987).
.14
In this context, the gusset was "the piece of flexible material introduced to fill up a
space at the joints between two adjacent pieces of mail." See THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 113.
"' Garrison Interview, supra note 92. See also 1 HARPER HOUSE PATTERN CATALOGUE
(1995) (offering folkwear patterns for sale, many of which include gusseted garments, and
providing an extensive bibliography for authentic costume design).
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color or different fabric textures to a garment. By 1570 the use of
gussets-had changed, as had the gusset, which had become defined
as "a triangular piece of material let into a garment to strengthen
or to enlarge some part, especially in order to afford ease in movement."'1 6 In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the gusset appeared as a common element of breeches and
short pants. And by the late nineteenth century, the gusset was as
ubiquitous as breeches themselves. Born of necessity in the suit of
armor, the gusset survived in the breeches that men (and later
women) wore while riding horses.11 7
Although the gusset has been in common use since the fifteenth
century, its heyday was in the nineteenth century when it was
widely used in trousers and breeches.'
In all of its incarnations
the gusset's use was primarily functional, not ornamental. Indeed,
so functional that over this extensive historic period the gusset
transcended private ownership and, in the American context,
became a part of the public domain. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century clothing designers incorporated it into
novelty garments for which they eventually acquired patent
protection. 9 By the late twentieth century the gusset was once
again used in everyday trousers and shorts as a public domain
item. Although the gusset has had a global history, this Article
looks at the gusset in its American embodiment, especially during
that period when it became "depicted" for prior use purposes under
35 U.S.C. § 103.120
1. Published Prior Art: The Gusset in Printed Publications
Describing Functionaland Novelty Wear. The gusset has had an
extensive history. In the American context the gusset is tied to the
116Garrison
17

Interview, supra note 92.
The first modern use of the gusset in trousers is difficult to trace, though it was

related to the prominence of the horse as a mode of transportation. That is, when breeches
buttoned at the knee, it was the gusset that allowed one to extend one's leg up to the stirrup
so that one could mount and straddle a horse.
11

See generally CLOTH AND CLOTHING IN MEDIEvAL EUROPE:

ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF

PROFESSOR E.M. CARUS-WILSON (N.B. Harte & K.G. Ponting eds., 1983); CAROLYN G.
BRADLEY, A HISTORY OF WORLD COSTUME (1964); BLANCHE PAYNE, A HISTORY OF COSTUME:
FROM THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1965); PHILIPPE PERROT,
FASHIONING THE BOURGEOISIE:

A HISTORY OF CLOTHING IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(1994).
11 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing and illustrating early patents incorporating the
gusset).
'20 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
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history of and historicization of the American cowboy. Cowboys
needed long, durable canvas pants, not breeches; and they needed
these pants to be both snug along the legs (to prevent excess
material from getting caught in saddle stirrups and girth straps)
and yet free enough to allow for ease of movement in mounting,
riding, and dismounting horses. 121 They also needed pants that
were inexpensive. In 1902 the Sears, Roebuck Catalogue, which
termed itself the "Cheapest Supply House on Earth," offered
"Cavalry Riding Pants" for $1.00.122 Cavalry Riding pants were
made out of buckskin color duck, and the "entire back half," though
apparently not gusseted per se, was doubled and "extend[ed]
between the crotch." 23 The 1902 Sears catalogue text distinguished between what it called "patent items" and, by implication,
non-patent (or public domain) items. There was no mention of a
patent in relation to the Cavalry Riding pant, thereby suggesting
its quasi-gusseted
that the Sears, Roebuck Company manufactured
24
pant as a public domain garment.'
In the early 1940s, the Lee Apparel Company manufactured bib
overalls and dungarees with a gusset. 125 Lee Apparel has not yet
21

1

See generally, WILLIAM GILCHRIST & ROBERTO MANZOTI, CULT: A VISUAL HISTORY OF

JEANS WEAR, AMERICAN ORIGINALS (1992); THE JEANS (Kesaharu Imai ed., 1991) (providing
a history ofjeans in Japanese text); THIS IS A PAIR OF LEVI JEANS (Downey et al. eds., 1995)
(offering material from the Levi Strauss & Co. Archives).
122

THE JEANS, supra note 121, at 75 (reproducing SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., CATALOGUE

No. 111, at 1154 (1902)). While the cavalry pants went for $1.00, the catalogue itself sold
that much, at 50o. Id.
for nearly
1
23Id.

....
.

5

4

Id. See also, Cavalry Pants, HARPER HOUSE PATTERN CATALOGUE, supra note 115, at 69.
124THE JEANS, supra note 121, at 75 (reproducing SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., CATALOGUE
No. 111, at 1154 (1902)).
" Telephone Interview with Len Larson, Archivist and Director of Apparel Design and
Technical Services, Lee Apparel Co. Inc. (Mar. 5, 1996).
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set up a corporate archive, so these garments are not available for
inspection. However, printed pictures of similar gusseted bib
overalls, circa 1940, show the gusset extending to a point, midthigh. 126 They also show, by fair inference, that the length of the
gusset from front to back was at least three times shorter than the
length of the gusset from side-to-side. In addition to manufacturing
the gusseted bib overall, Lee Apparel sold the "famous u-shaped
saddle crotch jean."12 '
This garment, though not gusseted,
worked like a gusseted garment. Cut with additional fabric in the
upper thigh area, it gave its wearer extra room in an otherwise
tight fitting garment. This augmentation, though innovative, was
not patented either as a design or as a cost cutting manufacturing
process. To the contrary, augmenting a jean with additional fabric
added to the cost of goods because it took more time to cut and sew
the augmented u-shaped saddle jean than it did to sew its unaugmented cross-seamed jean counterpart. 2 '
Also in this period, the relationship between cost, preference, and
retail availability of lower priced cross-seamed garments became

'"See THE JEANS, supra note 121, at 80-83 (picturing Stockman Farmer Supply Company
brand and Montgomery Ward brand products).
127

Id. at 101.
128See Larson Interview, supra note 125 (discussing Lee Apparels manufacturing of
overalls and dungarees with a gusset); Interview with Seymour Jaron, Owner and President,
SJ Mfg. Co., San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 11, 1996) (discussing manufacturing processes for
lower body garments and historical aspects of manufacturing).
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firmly established. Working cowboys preferred Wrangler Jeans to
Lee and Levi's Jeans, whereas "dude ranchers" were more inclined
to purchase Lee or Levi's brands.'2 9 This division in the market
influenced the rise of what would become the hegemony of the
cross-seam. Cowboys needed a low priced garment, which meant
that they preferred jeans that were free of cost raising features,
like gussets or extra-fabric augmentation. At the same time the
higher bracket jeans were increasingly marketed for "dude
ranchers," using the cowboy motif. One 1930 Levi Western Wear
wholesale catalogue, for instance, explicitly made reference to
historic motifs. i s It characterized its jeans vaguely as the jeans
of the "men who built the West, and the sons of their sons, busy
shaping this West into a monumental Empire," an image in line
with Levi's double horse, gold-digger trademark.'' But it did so
within the context of a "Western Wear" advertising campaign in
which the American cowboy was the central image. Thus, while
cowboy preference influenced jean manufacturers to rely on the
cross-seam as standard construction at the low end of the retail
market, the historicization of the cowboy played a part in naturalizing this preference at the higher end of the retail jean market.
This latter group of customers could afford comfort increasing
designs like the gusset or the augmented loose fit jean, but they
apparently chose instead to emulate the poor cowboy, at least when
it came to jean fashion. Thus, although there was eventually a

129

Larson Interview, supra note 125.

'30
131

See LEVI STRAUSS & CO., WESTERN WEAR 2 (1930).
Id.
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homogenization of the "jean" design, manufacturers competed over
the different images that they used to sell their products. What
was ownable in all of this competition among jean manufacturers,
domain,
after all, was not the design, since that was in the public
13 2
dress.
trade
of
doctrine
the
through
image,
but rather
When it came to other garments, gussets were more widely
available than they were in jeans."3 Early in the twentieth
century, for example, the single-panel, diamond-shaped gusset
momentarily gave way to the two-piece, triangle gusset in mass
marketed garments. The two-piece, triangle gusset was made up
of twin triangular pieces of fabric that were sewn together before
Like its one-piece counterpart,
being inserted into the pant.'
the two-piece gusset was a public domain item, but since it also
constituted a manufacturing process in an era where fabric width
was only forty-five inches, as opposed to today's sixty inches, the
process for cutting twin-gusseted trousers gained patent protection. 3 For the most part, however, gussets were widely available in twentieth century garments as public domain items, and
though some specific processes were indeed patented, the details of
to a designer or manufacturer of
gusseting remained obvious
36
trade.
the
in
skill
ordinary
Levi Strauss & Company was the most prominent company to
produce a garment that incorporated the two-piece gusset 37 as a
public domain item. 138 In 1922 and 1925, Levi Strauss & Co.
supra note 24 (noting that trade dress protects "identifying symbols").
" See supra notes 121-131 and accompanying text (comparing the history of the gusset

132 See

to the American cowboy).
' See HOLLEN, supra note 17 (illustrating the two-piece gusset). The gusset was used
in this context as a way to save fabric in a period when fabric width was forty-five inches,
not sixty inches. Jaron Interview, supra note 128; Larson Interview, supra note 125.
'S5 See U.S. Patent No. 4,392,259, "Trouser Construction," issued to Guido Bredo (July 12,
1983); U.S. Patent No. 478,190, "Trousers and c., and Pattern Therefor," issued to Richard

Hamilton and John G. Lewis (July 5, 1892).

"3 Jaron Interview, supra,note 128. An invention must be non-obvious to a person with
knowledge of the field before a patent will issue. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
37 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing the two-piece, triangle gusset).
" Telephone Interview with Kathleen McDonough, Assistant Archivist, Levi Strauss &
Co. Archives (Jan. 26, 1996). As there is no patent number or mark on the single remaining
"Ladies' Hiking Tog" garment that survives in the Levi Strauss & Co. Archives, the garment
itself confirms Levi historian McDonough's statement that it was not constructed under a

patent. But note that this type of gusset, which is distinct from the public domain gusset,
was eventually patented. See U.S. Patent No. 4,392,259, supra note 135; U.S. Patent No.
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offered the "Ladies' Hiking Tog," a gusseted pair of breeches. 3' 9
The cut of the Tog used the two-part gusset construction, but it did
so without reference to a patentee. Moreover, the togs were aimed
at a different market than the jean market. That is, even though
Levi Strauss & Co. relied on the two-part gusset construction in
manufacturing togs, that reliance was apparently not concerned
with cost. In 1922 a dozen pairs of khaki Hiking Togs sold for $27,
while a dozen corduroy Togs sold for nearly double that price at
$48.140 Levi Strauss & Co. produced the Ladies' Outing Knickerbockers during this same period. Knickerbockers also incorporated
the two-part gusset construction and sold for between $27 per
dozen pairs (for khaki knickerbockers) and $39 per dozen pairs (for
gaberdine knickerbockers).,4
This would put the wholesale price
of a single pair of togs in the $2.25 to $4.00 range, and knickerbockers in the $2.25 to $3.25 range, making the retail price of these
gusseted garments comparatively expensive for the period.
The use of the gusset in this historical period suggests that the
gusset was ultimately set aside in the functional wear market not
because it was forgotten, and hence subject to recapture as private
property, but rather because it added prohibitively to the cost of
goods. The customer base that bought jeans for everyday wear was
not the same base that bought gusseted togs and knickerbockers.
And whereas producers had tacit consumer permission, so to speak,
to innovate for comfort's sake in the $2.50 to $4.00 per garment
wholesale markets, they could not profitably innovate for comfort
in the $1.00 to $2.50 per garment retail markets. These economic
considerations were no doubt influential in forming today's
widespread consumer preference for the cross-seam in pants, which
is also supported by fashion considerations. In any case, the gusset
remained known to persons of ordinary skill in the garment
industry, since its design, use, and incorporation were all public

3,745,589, "Triangular Crotches for Trousers," issued to Ebbe Bruno Borsing, (Jul. 17, 1973);
U.S. Patent No. 478,190, supranote 135. Also, according to McDonough, there is no evidence
that gusseted denim jeans were ever manufactured by Levi Strauss & Co.
1
" McDonough Interview, supra note 138. See also LEVI STRAUSS & CO., MERCHANDISE
CATALOGUE (Feb. 6, 1922) [hereinafter LEVI CATALOGUE].
140 LEVI CATALOGUE, supra note 139. Kathleen McDonough believed that the gusseted
"Ladies Hiking Togs" were also offered for sale in 1925, though she did not have catalogue
confirmation of that offering. McDonough Interview, supra note 138.
141 LEVI CATALOGUE, supra note 139.
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domain information, but it was consciously set aside in certain
142
markets, no doubt in part, for economic and stylistic reasons.
In terms of functional wear, the gusset would not reappear in
American markets until Stacy Kuranz entered the market with a
design she called Movement Pants. 143 Kuranz's design, like the
designs before her was not manufactured with reference to 44a
patentee, even though it used a single, diamond-shaped gusset.'
Moreover, although Kuranz took the stance of ownership vis A vis
the Movement Pant design, she had neither a copyright nor a
patent on the gusset. 145 The embodied design was not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. 102(b). 46 And even if it had been, it would
have been considered abandoned and part of the public domain
because, as noted above, once a garment is made available for sale
to the public, its design becomes common property. 147 Despite
having no legally recognizable interest, Kuranz was able to license
the use of her design to others, perhaps because most of her
2

14 Jaron Interview, supra note 128.

" Kuranz testified at the deposition that she sold and distributed her product from
approximately 1973 to 1978 in stores and open markets up and down the West coast. She
also testified that she got the idea for the gusset from a pair of cut-off martial arts gi pants
that she saw while on a trip to New York City in the early 1970s. Deposition of Stacy
Elizabeth Kuranz at pp. 8, 16-18, Beanie Designs, Inc. v. Chi Concepts, Inc., No. 87-20420
(N.D. Ca. filed June 16, 1987).

Movement Pants (Circa 1973).
'" Deposition of Kuranz, supra note 143, at 10 (describing the gusset she used as a
"diamond-shaped piece of fabric [that] was longer from side to side than it was from front
to back, and it was symmetrical from front to back if you would divide the pattern in half,
from side to side').
" At the time the Movement Pants pattern was created, Kuranz went to a patent
attorney who told her that the pattern was not patentable, but that she could establish her
place in the life of the gusseted pant by mailing a copy of the pattern to herself. Kuranz
followed this advice. Telephone Interview with Stacy E. Kuranz, Movement Pants designer
(Aug. 13, 1996).
'" See supra Part II.A.
147 Jaccard v. R.H. Macy & Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942); Samuel Winston,
Inc. v. Charles James Servs., 159 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
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licensees sold in the same small stores and open markets that she
did.'"
Only one producer who traced its early designs to
Kuranz's Movement Pant pattern sold gusseted pants nationally
and internationally. That producer was Chi Concepts Incorporated. 149
Just after the Movement Pants' emergence in 1973 or 1974,
"Kickin' Jeans," a gusseted jean, was marketed by Century Martial
Arts, Inc."5 Kickin' Jeans incorporated a gusset that was made
out of a single, diamond-shaped piece of fabric elongated at the
sides and shortened from front to back.1
Shortly after the
appearance of the Kickin' Jeans, Chi Concepts, Inc. began to sell
lower body garments that used a single, diamond-shaped gusset. 152
In the 1990s other large retailers like Patagonia,
Gramicci, L.L. Bean, REI, Royal Robbins, and Lands' End also used
14' Deposition of Kuranz, supra note 143, at 23-32 (discussing "release agreement," and

names
149 of licensees authorized to use the design).

Id. at 112 (noting that she received $37,998 and 30,000 shares of common stock from

Chi Concepts in exchange for permission to use the design).
151

Kickin' Jeans Advertisement, BLACK BELT MAG. (Nov. 1979).
152

'Myn
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this public domain gusset in shorts and pants targeted at climbers,
boaters, and outdoor enthusiasts.
None of these companies
manufactured under a patent per se, despite the fact that a patent
had been issued for a similarly gusseted garment to a designer who
believed she had invented the gusset. 163
In sum, manufacturers in the functional wear market abandoned
the gusset because of economic and fashion concerns, even though
in the novelty market, manufacturers tended to innovate without
a focused concern for price. While early in the century functional
wear manufacturers produced for a broader range of customers
than did novelty wear manufacturers, by mid-century both
functional wear and novelty wear manufacturers were producing
for a fairly large and often affluent customer base. Gramicci, for
example, marketed their gusseted shorts to rock climbers and
outdoor enthusiasts; L.L. Bean and Lands' End marketed their
garments to affluent suburbanites who were willing to pay a little
more for comfort; and Chi Concepts marketed its products to
counter-culture idealists who found themselves in professional
careers.
These affluent customers, unlike the cowboys who
influenced jean design or their dude ranching counterparts,
preferred the long term comfort of the gusset to the short term
relief of either following fashion or buying garments at rock bottom
prices. They wanted quality construction, and like the Hiking Tog
wearers of yore, they were willing to pay a fair price for it.
In conclusion, while older prior art in printed publications did not
clearly depict the common stock gusset, by the 1970s it did.
Although the common stock gusset was previously referred to,
alluded to, and presupposed, it was in the 1970s that the gusset
was finally articulated (primarily through pictures, but also
through words) with a high degree of clarity. The Kuranz Move-

3 See infra notes 276-339 (describing patents issued to Bernice B. Polsky). Although
none of the above companies licensed with this designer, Patagonia and Gramicci paid her
a litigation avoidance fee. However, Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., which manufactured the
Freedom Pants, did license with Polsky. Telephone Interview with Cluett, Peabody & Co.
Attorney (name withheld upon request) (Jan. 16, 1996). See also Matthew Kasten, Seamless
Crotch PatentedPantsTraced to RPM, DAILY NEWS RECORD, June 13, 1986, at 2 (confirming
that RPM Fashions, a division of Cluett, Peabody & Co. "licensed from an inventor (Bernice
B. Polsky] who is 'totally unrelated to the apparel industry,' "and attributing the information
to Cluett, Peabody & Co. executive vice-president, Fred Rosenfeld.).
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ment Pants' 5 ' and Kickin' Jeans 5 5 both generated depictions
in printed publications clearly illustrating the standard, common
stock gusset as incorporated into street pants. The standard,
common stock gusset they showed was an elongated, diamondshaped piece of fabric that was longer from side to side than it was
from front to back, and it was cut with convex/concave sides. The
following discussion analyzes how this same definition also
emerged in patented prior art.
2. Patented PriorArt: The Gusset As IncorporatedInto Innovative Garments. As early as 1941, utility patents issued for innovative clothing designs presupposed the same gusset that the
printed, off-record prior art depicted. These patents were not for
the gusset per se. Indeed, where an inventor has tried to claim
ownership of the gusset via patent claims, such claims have been
disallowed.'
One inventor put it well when he noted in his
claims, "I am aware that it is not new to put insertions in the
57
crotch-seams of the garment. Such, however, I do not claim[."
Thus, the distinction between the gusset as a public domain item
and the garment as a patented item appeared in the claims of even
earlier American patents.
One of the earliest utility patents for a gusseted garment was
issued in 1891 to Marshall 0. West for an invention that he called
"Drawers." 5 '
West's patent, which was for underwear, not
outerwear, improved the drawer by adding a gusset, or as West
called it, a "gore." West described the gore as "a diamond-shaped
piece [of fabric] elongated at that end ... which is to serve as the
back, and either straight, convex, or concave at its edges to suit

'54

See supra note 143.

155

See supra note 151.

"1 See infra Part III.B. 1 (discussing Polsky's 1983 patent).
157

U.S. Patent No. 597,747, "Drawers," issued to Jeremiah A. Scriven (Jan. 25, 1898).

Scriven used this language to describe the diawond shaped piece of fabric shown below.

Id. at fig.2. See also U.S. Patent No.1,737,923, "Garment," issued to Harry P. Eckstein (Dec.
3, 1929).
8 U.S. Patent No. 453,874, "Drawers," issued to Marshall 0. West (June 9, 1891).
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drawers of different proportions." 59 With this language West
implied what later inventors would expressly iterate-that they
regarded the gusset as part of the public domain."6 Indeed, the
general consensus about the gusset was that its dimensions were
variable and depended on the dimensions of the garment as a
whole, especially since the goal of gusseting, after all, was to
incorporate and thus conform the gusset to the garment.
In 1909 Joseph Stecker gained patent protection for an outerwear
garment that incorporated a public domain gusset. 6 ' Stecker's
invention was a ventilated farmer's overall sporting a gusset, which
Stecker called an elastic crotch inset. 62 This gusset came to a
point in the upper to mid-thigh range and took the shape of "an
elongated diamond-shaped inset."'63 Stecker claimed that his
"overall-pants" were different from unpatentable, public domain
overalls (apparently including the gusseted Lee Apparel overalls)
because of the totality of the garment, which had unusually shaped
legs and a series of elastic gussets that eased "bending or stooping

15"
Id. at 1.
160See U.S. Patent to Scriven (No. 597,747), supra note 157.
" U.S. Patent No. 924,013, "Overalls," issued to Joseph Stecker (June 8, 1909).
162

Id. at63 fig.2.
'

Id. at 2.

Id. at fig.1.
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strain 16...
[and] provide[d] novel ventilating means for the
" 4
same.
Like West's undergarment, Stecker's ventilated overalls incorporated the public domain gusset, but he did not lay claim to it.
Moreover, like West, who described the public domain gusset as "a
diamond-shaped piece elongated at that end.., which is to serve
as the back, and either straight, convex, or concave at its edges," 165 Stecker described it as "substantially elongated" and
having a "diamond form." 6 6 Thus, by 1909, language describing
the public domain gusset began to emerge. The gusset was defined
as a diamond-shaped piece of fabric that was either straight,
convex, or concave at the edges. It was longer from side to side
than it was from front to back, and it came to an end in the upper
to mid-thigh range. Moreover, the public domain gusset was
distinguishable from the radically different long bicycle pant gusset
that had securely positioned itself in the private domain.'67
A utility patent issued in 1932 to Guy C. Tanner pressed forward

1

Id. at 1.

M U.S. Patent to West (No. 453,874), supra note 158, at 1.
16 U.S. Patent to Stecker (No. 924,013), supra note 161, at 3.
167 U.S. Patent No. 557,563, "Tights for Bicyclists," issued to Augustus W. Dunning
(Apr.
7, 1896).
af .

IL WMS

f

t-. 1

, A&W4

P.1.,ta'tp.I. t......

Id. at figs.3-4. Garrison also confirmed the existence of unusually shaped gussets that,
unlike the standard gusset, are treated as privately ownable. See Garrison Interview, supra
note 92.
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with a definition of the public domain gusset. 168 In his claims
Tanner added that the gusset was "more elastic in a direction
transversely of the two legs, that is, in a direction from one leg to
the other, and less elastic from front to back. "169 This utility
patent's claims were in line with prior claims in that it sought
protection for a garment as a whole, not for the idea of the public
domain gusset alone. 7 °
A 1941 patent issued to Irving B. Smith appears to be the first
to incorporate the gusset into a pair of street pants. 171 Smith's
pants were no ordinary pants; they had a detachable or concealable
gusset that the wearer could open up for increased lounging
comfort. 72 Smith's embodiment incorporated the public domain
gusset. His design envisioned a gusset that was an elongated,
diamond-shaped piece of fabric that ended in a point near the mid-

" U.S. Patent No. 1,891,884, "Undergarment," issued to Guy C. Tanner (Dec. 20, 1932).
Id. at 2.
170See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,486,507, "Garment Crotch Construction," issued to Robert
'69

N. Bregenzer et al. (Dec. 30, 1969) (claiming a panty-type garment); U.S. Patent No.
3,287,739, "Combination Bifurcated Garment," issued to Morris Kaplan (Nov. 29, 1966)
(claiming a combination panty and leg covering garment); U.S. Patent No. 2,705,801, "Pantie
Girdle," issued to Marion M. Chubby (Apr. 12, 1955) (claiming an entire panty girdle
garment); U.S. Patent No. 2,651,047, "Woman's Undergarment," issued to Nellie Emerson
(Sept. 8, 1953) (claiming a new form-fitting woman's undergarment); U.S. Patent to Guy C.
Tanner (No. 1,891,884), supra note 168 (claiming a new feminine undergarment).
The undergarment has its own unique history in patent law, which is outside the scope of
this Article. Some scholarship exists about the Victorian era, but little may be found about
the undergarment in the twentieth century. See, e.g., CECIL WILLETT & PHILLIS CUNNINGTON, THE HISTORY OF UNDERCLOTHES (1951). Nevertheless, if one were to write a history
of underclothes in the twentieth century, United States patents would no doubt serve as an
important source of archival information.
For an economic history of women's patenting activities relating to household inventions
and clothing, see B. Zorina Khan, Married Women's Property Laws and Female Commercial
Activity: Evidence from United States PatentRecords, 1790-1895, 56 J. OF ECON. HIST., 356
(1996).
171U.S. Patent No. 2,264,958, "Garment," issued to Irving B. Smith (Dec. 2, 1941).
172

Id. at figs.lA-B, 3A.
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thigh range and was more elastic from one leg to the other and less
elastic from front to back. 173 So standard was this gusset that
Smith did not describe its specifications as previous inventors had.
Nonetheless, inventor Smith did add to the description of the public
domain gusset by noting that its function was to prevent "binding
or chafing or tightness at or in the vicinity of the ... upper
thighs. 17 '
It is through the utility patent claims articulation process that
the public domain gusset came to be defined in the period between
1891 and 1941. This gusset was a diamond-shaped piece of fabric
that was elongated at the side ends. 171 It could be cut either in
a straight, convex, or concave way, depending entirely on the
176
proportion of the garment into which it was being incorporated.
The distance from side to side was longer than the distance from
front to back, and the elongated sides came to an end, usually in a
point somewhere around the mid to upper-thigh range. 1 77 In
addition, the public domain gusset was more elastic in a direction
transversely of the two legs-that is, in a direction from one leg to
the other-and less elastic from front to back.17' Finally, the
gusset's function served the purpose of comfort, 1 79 health,8 0 and
increased movement,' 8 ' particularly in preventing binding, chafing, and tightness in the upper inner-thigh area." 2
By 1957 patents using the public domain gusset took the tack
that I.B. Smith had taken; they used the word "gusset" as a sign-a
word with an established meaning." 3 However, even when these
later patents did describe the gusset, they presupposed its obvious-

173 id

174 Id.
178

at 1.

U.S. Patent to West (No. 453,874), supra note 158.

Id.
U.S. Patent to Stecker (No. 924,013), supra note 161.
178 U.S. Patent to Tanner (No. 1,891,884), supra note 168.
179See, e.g., U.S. Patent 1,633,610, "Nether Garment," issued to Alexander M. Schneider
(June 28, 1927) (purporting the garment to be comfortable).
'go See U.S. Patent to Eckstein (No. 1,737,923), supra note 157 (describing a "sanitary"
undergarment).
181 See, e.g., U.S. Patent to Smith (No. 2,264,958), supra note 171 (stating that the
garment should be worn during relaxation, lounging, or slumber).
176

177

182id.

"sSee, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2,812,516, "Garment with Elasticized Open Crotch," issued
to Joan M. Hoffman (Nov. 5, 1957) (using the term "gusset").

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

39

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2

242

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 4:203

ness to a person of ordinary skill in the trade." 4 That is, these
later patent texts assumed that the gusset's shape was obviously
shorter from front to back than from side to side depending on the
garment, or that it obviously and necessarily required an elongation
in the area of the inner thighs in order to conform properly to
street clothes,'" or that its shape changed depending on the
fabric used in the context-lending garment.'
Elongation in the area of the inner thigh area distinguished the
use of the gusset in outwear from its use in underwear. Girdles
and panty-hose, both of which were initially patented as innovative
nylon garments, used a small oval-shaped gusset that was arguably
so different from the public domain gusset as to be legally distinct
and thus, privately ownable.'5 7 However, even if those small
oval-shaped gussets seemed more like privately ownable gussets
than public domain ones, it was obvious to "a person having
ordinary skill in the art" that the elongated gussets would not work
in garments made of sheer nylon; therefore, modified smaller,
Accordingly, most of the patents
circular gussets conformed."s
relating to panty-hose construction were themselves consistent with
the patents that have been described in this section, with the
exception that later panty-hose patents sought protection for the
process of gusseting a nylon garment, not for the garment or the
gusset itself. 9
3. An Aside About the HistoricalReliability of PriorUse Evidence
That Defines the Gusset. Published prior art and twentieth century
patents refer to the common stock gusset and presuppose the same
definition for that gusset. Although the Kuranz Movement Pants

184 See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (discussing the nonobvious
requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)).
185 See supra notes 175-182 and accompanying text (discussing descriptions of the public

domain gusset found in patents between 1891 and 1941).
" See supra note 170 (listing patents for undergarments incorporating the gusset).
187

Id.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
" See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,549,493, "Method and Apparatus for Applying a Gusset to

'8

Manufactured Goods," issued to Vinicio Gazzarrini (Oct. 29, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,516,513,
"Method and Apparatus for Applying a Patch to Manufactured Goods," issued to Vinicio
Gazzarrini (May 14, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,021,861, "Pantyhose Construction," issued to
Walter H. Imboden (May 10, 1977); U.S. Patent No. 3,678,515, "Panty-Hose," issued to
Nicholas Wehrmann (July 25, 1972).
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and its progeny, and Century Martial Arts, Inc.'s Kickin' Jeans are
the clearest visual depictions of the common stock gusset as
incorporated into street pants, patents better verbally articulate
what constitutes a common stock gusset. The patented garments
cited herein incorporate a common stock gusset and therefore
constitute an important body of historical evidence.
This section recognizes the importance of historical data in
patent analysis. 1" Therefore, the surface historical data drawn
from the PTO's files requires further explanation. To introduce and
frame, but certainly not exhaust that discussion, this section
approaches the gusset question from a slightly different tack. It
explores the historical data's reliability, not in definitional terms as
was done in the previous section, but in symbolic terms. The
patents are obviously reliable in terms of dates and substance, but
their reliability goes far deeper, as this section explains.
The public domain gusset, like the common dinner plate, is a
common stock item, one best described with the metaphor of a
trajectory in time rather than with the metaphor of a single point
of invention.1 91 In other words, even though the gusset, like the
plate, spoon, fork, and napkin, is functional, it did not come into
use solely because it offered technical solutions or even general,

' o See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1461 (1996) (holding that a patent's prosecution history is relevant to the court's determination of the scope of the patent claim).
" For this reason the gusset fits well within current discussions about protection of
folklore. See, e.g., Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protectionof Intangible
Cultural Property, 1 J. IN=ELL. PROP. L. 293, 310 (1994) (defining folklore and noting that
the Berne Convention has altered its authorship provisions to include anonymous folklore
protection).
Folklore is a living phenomenon which evolves over time. It is a basic
element of our culture which reflects the human spirit. Folklore is thus
a window to a community's cultural and social identity, its standards and
values. Folklore is usually transmitted orally, by imitation or by other
means. Its forms include language, literature, music, dance, games,
mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts and other arts. Folklore
comprises a great many manifestations which are both extremely various
and constantly evolving. Because it is group-oriented and traditionbased, it is sometimes described as traditional and popular folk culture.
Id. at 310-311, (quoting Kanwal Puri, Copyright Protection of Folklore: A New Zealand
Perspective, COPYRIGHT BuLL., vol. 22, no. 3, at 18-19 (1988)).
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nontechnical solutions to identifiable and discrete problems. 1' 2
It came into use for cultural reasons as well. As one historian says
of table implements:
[T]heir functions [were] gradually defined, their
forms sought and consolidated. Each custom in the
changing ritual [that involved them], however
minute, establishe[d] itself infinitely slowly....
Every movement of the hand-for example, the way
in which one [held] and [moved the] knife, spoon, or
fork-[was]19 3standardized only step by step [over
centuries].
The same is true of the gusset. It came into use gradually,
sometimes having more prominence in daily life, sometimes less.
Because it added to the cost of goods, it was a potential, although
(if constructed properly) barely noticeable, status symbol. Nonetheless, it was a symbol, an idea, and an item without an originator.
What makes the gusset part of the public domain is not that we
no longer know the identity of its "inventor." What makes it a
public domain item, in the sense that folklore is public domain, is
that it was not and could not be dropped upon the culture for ready
assimilation via the market, primarily because it is not novel in
any sense of the word. Public domain items often emerge from
cultural movement.19 4
They appear, not necessarily through
invention, and then they are adopted slowly through a gradual,
somewhat unconscious process, like the one described for table

'Such

a development would suggest the gusset would be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.

§§ 101-103 (1994). See also In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (holding that claiming a new benefit to an old process cannot render that process
newly patentable); AMP, Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 808, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires an invention
to be useful before a utility patent may issue). Cf Ryco, Inc. v. AG-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d
1418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that invention need not be superior
to prior art to be patentable, only an improvement).
14 ELIAS, supra note 7, at 107-108.

See ELIAS, supra note 7; Litman, supra note 109; Berryman, supra note 191.
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implements.1 9 5 Often a public domain item starts out as a cultur-

al irritant, but once the decision is made to adopt it-again in
single moments that can span the course of centuries-it slowly,
gradually, and unconsciously becomes part of everyday life,
sometimes so much so (as with the fork) that its use seems natural,
inevitable, and self-explained.'9
But while the gusset is like table implements in many respects,
it is unlike them in equally important respects. The gusset's
history is only loosely tied, if at all, to shifting standards of adult
socialization or "civilization," whereas the history of table implements is intimately tied to such standards. 9 ' Table implements
gave people something to be ashamed of; that is, as table implements and manners became refined they served as a way of
pushing bodily functions to a realm of "shame" that grew in
psychosocial importance between the fifteenth and twentieth
century.9 8 However, because they allowed for the steady dephysicalization of the table, table implements also increasingly helped
actors maintain, if not expand, this psychosocial territory whose
control was constitutive of social status. 99 In other words, as
table implements helped push certain bodily functions and
activities to the realm of the unspeakable, people become increasingly more sensitive to and less tolerant of once accepted behaviors
that they had come to believe were now "naturally" unspeakable.
Blowing one's nose into one's hand at the table, for example, was
perfectly acceptable in medieval society, but utterly reprehensible
by the twentieth century. °° The gusset, for its part, is not
wrapped in this sort of intrigue; it has a more straightforward
history.
Although the gusset is directly connected to an area of the body
that we regard as private, it does not function with the duplicity

1 See ELIAS, supra note 7. See also Berryman, supra note 191 (discussing intellectual

property law protection of folklore).
19 For a description of how this process occurs, see PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL

COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 82-88 (1992) (discussing
the work of Thomas Kuhn).
197 ELIAS, supra note 7.

198Id.
9 Id.
2

Id. at 143-52.
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that table implements do. Gussets are not used to distinguish the
"well, mannered" from the "not-so-well mannered;" they merely
increase physical comfort. And even when the insertion of a gusset
increases the price of a garment, thus serving as a potential marker
of its wearer's economic status, the status symbol is hard to detect
since a well constructed gusseted garment ought to be virtually
indistinguishable from a cross-seamed one. In other words, there
is a historical and legal significance about the directness with
which the gusset has come to us. That significance determines the
reliability of documentary evidence regarding gusset use, as found
in corporate archives and patents.
The evidence in corporate archives tends to be influenced by
advertising campaigns. As discussed above, the data is somewhat
vague in both depiction and description, at least up until the mid1970s. In addition, corporate advertising is more discreet than the
evidence found in patents. In corporate advertising, the word
"crotch" is used in the early part of the century up to the early
1940s,2 °" avoided in the mid part of the twentieth century, 2

and then reiterated as a radicalizing move in the latter part of the
twentieth century, specifically in the 1980s and again in the late
1990s with ChiPants's "Mythic Entrepreneur" advertising campaign."' In patents, on the other hand, descriptive clarity of the
gusset is achieved by 1941. Of equal importance, the figures and
language used to describe the gusset's shape, purpose, and
characteristics are unconsciously and consistently straightforward.
They do not convey embarrassment or self-consciousness about
referring to an area of the body to which a large degree of shame
and embarrassment has been culturally attached. Nor are they
twisted by artifice or polite misdirection. Instead these figures and
language convey a clear and verifiable definition of the public
domain gusset.
2' See, e.g., supra note 127 (depicting the Lee "Dude Ranch Jean").
202See supra notes 151-152 (showing Kickin' Jean and ChiPants advertisements).
Interview with Laurence Ostrow, Owner and President of Chi Concepts, Inc. and
ChiPants, Inc. (Jan. 11, 1996) (noting that the ChiPants advertising campaign was "on-line"
in its 1990s incarnation). Chi Concepts, Inc. and ChiPants, Inc. are legally distinct entities.
Chi Concepts, Inc. sold gusseted pants from 1986 to 1991; it was forced to close after a major
earthquake destroyed its Santa Cruz, Cal. and Watsonville, Cal. bases. ChiPants, Inc.
currently sells gusseted pants via the World Wide Web; it opened in 1995. See also supra

note 152 (showing ChiPants advertisement).
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The public domain gusset, which is incapable of private ownership under either copyright or patent law systems, is a diamondshaped piece of fabric that is inserted into pants, trousers, and the
like, as a crotch piece that offers greater freedom of movement than
is offered by the cross-seam. In order to offer this increased
freedom of movement, the fabric must conform to the wearer's
crotch area and inner thighs. Hence, the public domain gusset, is
obviously and necessarily a diamond-shaped piece of fabric that is
shorter from front to back and elongated from side to side, so that
it can easily and securely shift and stretch with the wearer's own
trunk movements. Because the public domain gusset cannot be
copyrighted or patented, it is beyond private ownership. Nevertheless, there are two alternative strategies that have been employed
to capture the public domain gusset's economic value. The first
strategy is in derogation of the public right in the gusset. 2" The
second respects the gusset as a public domain item, choosing
instead to perfect an ownership interest in the image with which
the gusset is delivered to the public.20 5 Part III considers the
first of these strategies.
III. ENCROACHING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Manufacturers, retailers, and designers have regarded the gusset
in the same way that they regard pants, shirts, and other common
cuts of clothing-as part of the public domain. From time to time,
inventors lay claim to a highly unusual garments, like the hiphugging, gusseted, neoprene waders; 20 6 or to innovative processes,
like the two-part gusset construction.2 °7 But for the most part,
as the doctrine and the patent claims discussed in Part II show,
there is tacit agreement in the garment industry that the basic
design and form for pants is well within the public domain. 208

2 See infra notes 276-339 (describing how Polsky obtained three patents under which
terms she purported to claim ownership of the gusset).
See supra note 24 (discussing trade dress).
2w U.S. Patent No. 5,081,718, "Pants Type Garment Having a Seamless Crotch," issued
to David C. Carman et. al. (Jan. 21, 1992).
'2oSee U.S. Patent to Bredo (No. 4,392,259), supra note 135; U.S. Patent to Borsing (No.
3,745,589), supra note 138; U.S. Patent to Hamilton and Lewis (No. 478,190), supranote 135.
See supra notes 113-155 and accompanying text (explaining how the gusset has come
to be defined).
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The same is true of the gusset, even when it is incorporated into
otherwise innovative garments. Gussets similar to the Dunning
gusset'
are highly unusual in relation to the common stock
gusset. Hence, they gain patent protection as innovative items
within a particular, sometimes innovative, context-lending garment. 210 But most gussets are identical or virtually identical to
what can be called the common stock (or public domain) gusset.
This gusset is the one that has made its way through time as
folklore. This part analyzes how something so resolutely public as
the gusset becomes private.
In the early 1980s, three separate patents were issued to a single
inventor, Bernice B. Polsky. These patents-referred to herein as
the Polsky series-attempted to lay claim to the gusset qua gusset.
Each of the three patents tried to encroach upon the public's right
to the gusset in a different way. The first patent stated a direct
claim for ownership of the gusset, using a simple encroachment
strategy. 11 The second patent tried to capture the common stock
gusset by contextualizing it in street trousers.2
This strategy
followed earlier patent trends that had contextualized the common
stock gusset in innovative garments, but it differed from those
trends by treating the common pants design itself as innovative-a
move that was contrary to the practice in the trade. 21 3 Finally,
the third strategy in the Polsky series manipulated the bureaucratic decisionmaking process of the PTO. 214 Although the third
strategy was the most theoretically complex of the three, it can be
synthesized at this point by noting that it was based upon a claim
that the gusset had been "forgotten," and was thus subject to
o See U.S. Patent to Dunning (No. 557,563), supra note 167 (claiming a long bicycle pant
that incorporates a gusset in its design).
210
id.
211 U.S. Patent No. 4,371,989, "Seamless Crotch," issued to Bernice B. Polsky (Feb. 8,
1983) [hereinafter U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989)]. See also infra notes 276-291 and
accompanying text.
212 U.S. Patent No. 4,488,317, "Pants-like Garments Having a Seamless Crotch
Construction," issued to Bernice B. Polsky (Dec. 18, 1984) [hereinafter U.S. Patent to Polsky
(No. 4,488,317)]. See also infra notes 292-314 and accompanying text.
M See supra notes 113-155 and accompanying text (detailing the historical development
of the gusset).
2'14See U.S. Patent No. 4,785,480, "No-Bind Pants with Seamless Crotch," issued to
Bernice B. Polsky (Nov. 22, 1988) [hereinafter U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480)]. See
also infra notes 315-339 and accompanying text.
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recapture by the first person who could (officially) "remember"
215
it.
The particularities of these three strategies are important to
consider because they help illuminate the boundary between
private property and the somewhat symbolic space known as the
"public domain." More specifically, they are an example of an
actual attack on a common resource, the gusset, something much
more instrumental than theoretical attacks by scholars.2 16
Polsky's first two strategies-simple encroachment and contextualizing the gusset in what inventor Polsky argued was an innovative garment-were primarily technical attacks in that they were
waged by patent lawyers who presented Polsky's claim within the
parameters and discourse of an established intellectual property
framework. 217 The third strategy, however, seriously challenged
that same framework by shifting its focus from substance to
procedure.218
Astonishingly, interviewed manufacturers and pattern makers in
the garment industry had strong negative reactions to the Polsky
patent series. Their remarks consistently raised questions about
the institutional legitimacy of granting the Polsky patents. One
manufacturer said that he thought the PTO had been bribed.21 9
Another said that the PTO had perhaps unwittingly given Polsky
a license "to extort other people in business."220 One pattern
maker more eloquently thought that by granting the second and
third patents to Polsky, the PTO had infringed on "everyone else's
right to use the gusset."22 1 She likened the gusset to a shirt
sleeve or a pant leg, noting that "everyone learns how to gusset in
215 See

infra notes 276-339 and accompanying text (analyzing the details and terms of the

three
21 6 Polsky patents).
See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 10 (arguing that there is no public domain; there is just
property that the copyright and patent system will not protect).
217 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (holding that
construction of patent claims is a question of law for the court and not subject to a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial).
2
's See infra notes 315-339 (describing the details and problems with Polsky's attainment
of the 1987 patent and the related infringement action).
219Ostrow Interview, supra note 203.
oTelephone Interview with San Francisco inventor, investor, and entrepreneur Maurice
Kambar (Jan. 11, 1996).
" 1 Garrison Interview, supra note 92. This view is consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1994)
which determines the nature of the PTO's proceedings.
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pattern-making 101, and everyone knows that everyone has the
right to use the gusset, just as everyone has the right to use a pant
leg or a sleeve."2 22 She also thought that the PTO "should have
asked a few people in the industry before granting the patents to
Even Stacy Kuranz, the originator of Movement
Polsky." 2 '
Pants,2 2 4 recalled consulting a patent attorney who told her that
her design was not patentable and wondered aloud how the PTO
could have issued the Polsky patents. 2
Yet the PTO could not inquire on its own into industry opinion
or practice and, therefore, was dependent on information from
Polsky about the prior art.226 However, Polsky did not adequately
fulfill this duty.22 7 Moreover, because Polsky offered only the
prior art that was recorded in the PTO's own records, she effectively subordinated "off-record," or "unofficial," depictions to "official"
depictions. Unfortunately, with property whose historic use is
primarily a matter of oral history and off-record depiction as is the
gusset's, such a subordination can be detrimental to its continued
existence as a public domain item. 2"
Consequently, this subordination process became the first point
of "forgetting," at least in the gusset's American history. This part
analyzes Polsky's patents as the portal by which to examine how
something that
something that "everyone had the right to use,
had been in the public domain for more than 600 years (at least in
the European and American context) arguably became the intellectual property of one individual in less than a single decade. 23
nId.
2ld.

224

See supra note 143.

2nId.

35 U.S.C.

§ 112 (1994) (discussing the specification of a patent application). "Each

individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of
candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the
Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability." 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56 (1996). All individuals associated with the patent prosecution process are held to this
duty which extends throughout the prosecution process. Id.
2
See infra notes 316-320 and accompanying text (discussing Polsky's incomplete

disclosure statement).
But see Samuels, supra note 10 (asserting that the public domain does not exist).
Garrison Interview, supra note 92.
One clear example of a case where innovative information has been forgotten, and thus
subject to recapture, comes from the automobile industry. Otieno-Odek, supra note 110, at
21. Though not the subject of litigation, the case involved a 1990 Nissan/Cylinder Block
patent for an engine cylinder block with an upper and skirt section of "known general
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Most of the information used in this section comes not from the
actual patents themselves-though those are important sources of
information-but from the patent prosecution files, or the "patent
file wrappers." File wrappers are public documents and are
available from the PTO upon request. 1 The file wrapper constitutes the recorded history of an individual patent. It is a detailed
record of the patentee's claims, the PTO's responses to those claims,
and the patentee's response to those responses. 232 In this case,
the Polsky file wrappers are important to the analysis because they
provide information about how the PTO responded to the initial
wording of the Polsky claims and helped to shape their final
articulation.'
As discussed in Part II, some property, because it is cultural
property, is beyond private ownership and, therefore, beyond
complete private control. In a system where nearly everything is
subject to private ownership, identifying something that is not
ownable,234 something beyond ownership, helps to explore the
meaning that we have come to give to the term "property." It also
helps explore what is meant by the phrase "common stock," and
how it is that the commons might be a symbolic space well worth
studying.
How do we know that the gusset is in the public domain?
Similarly, how do we know that there is such a space as the public

configuration" (i.e., a trapezoid supporting frame fixed to the floor for stationery engines).
There was prior art depicted in 1914, but that art, given the gap in time and perhaps more
importantly, the new industry context (cars), was not considered sufficient to block the
issuance of the 1990 patent. Id.
23
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (explaining the requirement for specification in patent
applications); Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d 435, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1st Cir.
1976) (defining the file wrapper as the written record of the preliminary negotiations
between applicant and the PTO).
Norton, 530 F.2d 435.
For a related discussion on how bureaucratic processes can shape or otherwise mediate
legal claims, see Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity: The NationalEnvironmental
Policy Act and the BureaucraticConstruction of Interests,28 LAW & SOC. REV. 1149 (1994).
' There are multiple ways that an item can fall into the public domain. See, eg.,
Samuels, supra note 10 (detailing the following ways that proponents say items may fall into
the public domain: through expiration of copyright; through forfeiture of copyright; as a work
categorically excluded from copyright; through aspects of otherwise copyrightable works; as
a substitute for preemption analysis; or, as a substitute for measuring the retroactivity of
copyright enactments). This Article is primarily concerned with material folklore, and hence,
it considers the gusset to be the sort of property that has always been common property that
does not fit easily into any of the above categories.
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domain? To deal with the gusset first, we know that it is not
subject to copyright protection either as graphic or embodied design
because it is an "idea."'
Nor is it subject to patent law protection because it is obvious, or not "novel.""6 It has a long history
of off-record and on-record prior art. It is depicted in the historical
and professional memories of garment designers, pattern makers,
and manufacturers, in popular catalogues and magazines, and in
patents. 7 When inventors have "borrowed" the gusset from the
public domain for patented garments, they have done so with an
awareness of its status as common property. 3 Patented garments that employ the standard, diamond-shaped gusset consistently treat it as part of the public domain."' 9 Moreover, the
evidence revealing this consistent treatment is fairly straightforward, despite the fact that the gusset is a special kind of property,
one with folkloric dimensions.
Assuming the gusset is indeed commonly owned property, or
maybe even symbolic property, does that mean that it is in the
public domain? Is it a common access idea? Alternatively, is there
any way that it can be recaptured and brought back within the
confines of the private property system by either direct or indirect
appropriation? These questions are answered by first analyzing the
public domain as a legally recognizable space and then analyzing
the Polsky series vis h vis the common stock gusset.
A. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS A SPACE

While there is scholarly disagreement over whether there is such
a space as the public domain in intellectual property law, the
garment industry appears to have reached a more definitive
answer, at least in relation to the use of the gusset. Some scholars
say that there is a public domain, or a commons, and that its

See supra Part IIA (explaining why the gusset is not subject to copyright protection).
"6See supra notes 100-112 and accompanying text (arguing that because the gusset is
obvious, it is not subject to patent protection).
2 See supra notes 113-155 and accompanying text (showing that the gusset is prior art).
' See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing inventors who have previously "borrowed" the gusset
recognizing that it was in the public domain).
2
" See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text (explaining that the gusset is treated
as part of the public domain by most of the fashion industry).
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preservation is important as a political matter.2" They equate
the loss of the public domain with the increased privatization of our
society. 2 " They seem fairly certain that the incantation "property" seems to overshadow issues related to citizens' rights.24 2
In order to counter this serious problem, proponents of the public
domain theory in intellectual property law collectively point to the
existence and importance of imagining the "public domain," or
"commons." At least two proponents have explicitly grounded the
existence of the public domain in Lockean theory. 24 They refer
to Locke's discussion of the "state of nature" to argue that as a
matter of political theory, justifying the institution of intellectual
property depends upon accepting a set of presuppositions about the
existence of the commons. 2 4
Other scholars take different approaches.24 5 Some argue that
the nature of creativity demands belief in a pool of common access
property, or ideas.2 46 Others analogize the commons in intellectual property to "the public grazing lands on the Western plains of a
century ago. "24 7 There is also the position, perhaps linked to
Locke, but certainly based on Foucault, that the loss of the
intellectual property commons makes the world an increasingly

"' See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 14; Coombe, supra note 14 (claiming that intellectual
property laws may deprive Americans of the optimal cultural conditions for dialogic practice);
Gordon, supra note 14 (suggesting that current intellectual property law allows for more
rights than is justified under a natural rights theory); Hughes, supra note 4 (asserting that
nothing is beyond legal protection).
241 Coombe, supra note 14.
242 Gordon, supra note 14, at 1537 ("courts have too often turned a deaf ear to these

arguments. The incantation 'property' seems sufficient to render free speech issues
invisible.").
w' See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14 (presenting a theory of intellectual property using
Locke's treatment of tangible property as a commons); Hughes, supra note 4, at 319-23
(offering a philosophical explanation for why both everyday and extraordinary ideas (like an
algorithm) should not be easily registrable as private property).
24 See Gordon, supra note 14; Hughes, supra note 4.
' There is a growing body of law review literature on this point. Only the most
commonly noted tacks are offered here.
2"See Aoki, supra note 14; Kurtz, supra note 30 (suggesting that the primary purpose
of copyright is to promote creativity and disseminate creative works and that extensive
copyright protection inhibits literary imagination); Litman, supra note 109 (asserting that
the public domain should be looked upon as a device for leaving the raw material of
authorship available).
247 David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1981,
at 147, 176.
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"artifactual," or artificial, rehearsed place.Y2
There are theories
that link the loss of the public domain to problems of gender or
subjectivity. 249 And there are theories that argue that a broad
and vigorous public domain is critical to developing nations that
are just now setting up intellectual property systems with the
priority of adaptating existing technologies to local conditions. 250
In response to all of this stands one resolute contrarian. 2'
About the intellectual property public domain, he says, "there is no
such animal: the public domain is simply whatever remains after
all methods of protection are taken into account."2 2 As to the
trend of writing in general (universalizing) terms of a "theory of the
public domain," he responds that it is appropriate to make inquiries
into historical context, but cautions against being "stuck with"
constructions of old statutes, especially in the field of copyright law
where "the statutes themselves get amended to reflect the new
reality." 3 The commentator argues that just because a particular property does not get protection under federal law does not
mean that it is "in the public domain," because it might gain
protection under unpre-empted state laws. 254
Despite the argument that the public domain does not exist,
there are clear benefits that flow from designating something as

20 Aoki, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that the article's conclusion discusses "some
implications of U.S. intellectual property law's focus on rewarding clearly individuated
creative/transformative originality in an artifactual environment such as ours, in which
increasing areas of our public and private social, cultural and scientific worlds are becoming
the private intellectual property of other people." (emphasis added)).
29 Coombe, supra note 14.
' Otieno-Odek, supra note 110, at 16 ("To developing countries, a vigorous and broad
public domain is imperative for the creation of local inventiveness and an adaptive research
capability. It is also critical to the creation of a cadre of scientific personnel. A broad public

domain would permit a developing country to modify and utilize existing technology and
transpose the same to suit its local conditions.") See also STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF LITERATURE (Wolfgang

E. Siebeck ed., (1990)) (reviewing economic literature, both theoretical and empirical,
covering the economics of patents and other instruments of intellectual property in
developing countries).
2" Samuels, supra note 10.
2mId. at 138.
2u

Id. at 146-47.
166.

2"Id. at
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public domain, and these benefits help reveal industry opinion. 5
Evidence exists, again from the case of the gusset, that tells us that
manufacturers do indeed take into account the perhaps mythical
space called the public domain, especially when predicting the cost
of goods.256
If property is designated as patented, then the
patentee has the right to license the patent, and those who would
use the invention have the correlative duty to obtain a license from
the patentee before they use the information contained in the
patent.1 7 This license would add to the producer's cost of goods.
But one other phenomenon that the gusset example illustrates well
is that the issuance of a patent is only a first step in bringing the
patentee's intellectual property rights to life. 258 At least in the
garment industry, even if the PTO issues a patent, the industry can
still overturn the PTO's decision in a de facto way.25 9 This vote
of confidence (or lack thereof) comes in the form of licensing, or
refusing to license, under the patentee.
In the specific case of the Polsky series, the industry disagreed
with the PTO as to the validity of each patent by simply going
along with business as usual, not bothering to license with
Polsky.2 ' Although this carried with it the risk of litigation, the
risk never came to pass. While Polsky threatened to sue Patagonia
and Gramicci, they paid her a flat fee to stop threatening, thereby
registering their need to avoid litigation, but not necessarily
signifying ratification of the PTO's decision to grant Polsky a

' See, e.g., Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 862 F.2d 322, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (noting that by virtue of the market alone, there will be few, if any, licensees on

a patent that those of ordinary skill in the art industry feel is obvious).
25

See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

CoLLEcTIvE AcTION (1991) (arguing that the current policy debate about the commons
overlooks important ways in which actors govern common pool resource areas, and that
empirical evidence of how actors actually treat common pool resources is needed both as a

source of information and as a foundation for theory building).
2
", See Gordon, supranote 14 (discussing correlative duties within the terms of a Lockean
scheme); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980) (discussing
correlative duties within the terms of an Hohfeldian scheme).
"s See, e.g., Badalamenti, 862 F.2d 322.
'

2

Id.

Polsky's three file wrappers show that she brought one law suit to enforce her patent
rights. That sole law suit was against Chi Concepts, Inc. Beanie Designs, Inc. v. Chi
Concepts, Inc., No. 87-20420 (N.D. Ca. filed June 16, 1987).
'
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patent.6 1 With respect to some of the larger corporations like
L.L. Bean and Lands' End, none of them were apparently approached by Polsky, nor did they approach her to license.2 62 Only
Polsky's complaint against Chi Concepts, the smallest of the
companies named, registers in Polsky's file wrappers. 2 ' And, if
Chi Concepts licensed, it did so because licensing was less expensive than defending a patent infringement case. This economic
calculus, like Patagonia's or Gramicci's calculus, was a business
decision, not
a vote of confidence for the PTO's decisionmaking
2 4
process. r

All in all, the industry's stance toward Polsky was either to
ignore her patent on the theory that the PTO had made a mistake,
or to pay her a nuisance fee-in the interest of preserving investment capital by avoiding litigation costs. 265 Most actors in the
industry correctly presumed that the gusset was in the public
domain, and thus their right to use the gusset preceded Polsky's
patent. 286 Cluett & Peabody Co., Inc. did license with Polsky in
order to produce Freedom Pants.6 7 However, this effort ended in
failure. 2' Therefore, while Polsky had a patent, she had never

" Telephone Interview with Patagonia Counsel (name withheld upon request) (Jan. 11,
1996).
' There is no mention of licensing to either of these large companies in the file wrappers
of the three Polsky patents. File Wrapper, U.S. Patent No. 4,371,989, issued to Bernice B.
Polsky [hereinafter File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989)]; File Wrapper, U.S.
Patent No. 4,488,317, issued to Bernice B. Polsky [hereinafter File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to
Polsky (No. 4,488,317)]; File Wrapper, U.S. Patent No. 4,785,480, issued to Bernice B. Polsky
[hereinafter File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480)].
' ' File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,981), supra note 262; File Wrapper,
U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra note 262; File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky
(No. 4,785,480), supra note 262.
24 Ostrow Interview, supra note 203.
w5 Id.
' See, e.g., Jaron Interview, supra note 128 (relaying that as a garment manufacturer,
he operates under the assumption that the gusset is a public domain article).
See supra note 153 (discussing the Freedom Pants licensing agreement).
There appears to be a loose consensus among the manufacturers interviewed that one
possible reason for the failure of Freedom Pants was a combination of Polsky's lack of
experience with garment production and Cluett & Peabody Co.'s lack of care with the
production process. Another possibility, however, is that since Cluett & Peabody Co.
manufactured Freedom Pants out of polyester twill, they were appealing to the discount end
of the market, a market that historically has not been able to afford the gusset innovation,
and hence has not developed a preference for it. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying
text (discussing the relationship of cost to style preference).
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produced a single manufactured product. She had a drawing and
description but no manufacturing expertise to back them up in an
industry known for its fast, furious, and competitive pace.269
Still, if Polsky's claims were so vague, if she simply reiterated
something for which there was clearly depicted prior art, then how
did she get not one, but three patents? The next section takes up
this issue.
B. ABSTRACTION IN LINES AND CURVES-THE POLSKY INVENTION
PROCESS

The Polsky series represents a systematic attempt to lay claim to
the gusset. The series begins with the 1983 Polsky patent in which
Polsky claimed the gusset, but instead gained protection for a
cotton and lycra exercise garment that incorporated the common
stock gusset. ° The second patent in the Polsky series was
issued in 1984.271 It claimed ownership of pants that incorporated the common stock gusset.17 2 The third patent was issued in
1988.273 Citing the first two Polsky patents as references, it
claimed an innovative garment (pants) that incorporated an
"innovative" gusset, as described in the dependent claims. 4 The
1988 patent was entirely inconsistent with the 1983 patent in the
sense that in 1983, the PTO identified as the standard, common
stock gusset the very same gusset Polsky described and "claimed"
in the 1988 process. 5
1. Simple Encroachment-The 1983 Polsky Patent. In 1983,
Bernice Polsky filed for a U.S. Patent for an invention she called

' Kasten, supra note 153 (corroborating Polsky's lack of experience in the garment
industry); Garrison Interview, supra note 92 (describing Polsky's patent claim language as
vague in terms of the specificity required to produce a garment and noting that the Polsky
patents revealed no new art from her perspective as a pattern maker); Jaron Interview,
supra note 128 (describing why the Polsky patents reveal no new art from his perspective
as a garment manufacturer).
270 U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note 211.
271 U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra note 212.
272Id.

273
U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 214.
2 74
id.
27'

File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note

262.
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"Seamless Crotch." Polsky's initial filing contained three independent claims, only one of which was ultimately allowed by the
PTO.2 6 In the two claims that were rejected, Polsky attempted
to lay claim to the gusset. 277 She did this by placing her 1983
patent squarely in line with the previous Dunning line of patents,2 78 perhaps on the mistaken assumption that the gusset
shape she claimed as her own was radically different from the
standard, common stock gusset.279
Recall that the standard gusset is defined as a diamond-shaped
piece of fabric that is inserted into pants in lieu of a cross-seam; it
is shorter from front to back, and elongated from side to side; and
it conforms with the wearer's inner thigh area so as to allow for
increased leg movement. 210 "Concave," "elongated," "curved," and
"tapering" are terms often used to refer to the common stock
gusset.21' What Polsky claimed during the prosecution phase of
her 1983 patent was a cross-seam alternative having "long tapering
portions," "concave edges," and an "elongated curved diamond"
shape.8 2 This claim placed Polsky's gusset well within what had
been previously used to identify the public domain gusset.
By citing the Dunning patent, however, Polsky was asserting
that her diamond shaped gusset was sufficiently different from the
common stock gusset to warrant a monopoly. 2 3 These assertions

27

See File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (July 15, 1982), U.S. Patent to Polsky (989),

supra note 211, at 264 (rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and 35 U.S.C. § 102).
277id.

2" See U.S. Patent to Dunning (No. 557,563), supra note 167 (claiming a one-piece
vertically ribbed knitted gusset patented to fit the crotch, seat, and legs).
'
File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (989), supra note 262
(describing the gusset shape claimed as having "unique construction").
' See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing early patents incorporating the gusset).
281 Id.

's File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note

262.

Id. at fig.4.
'2 See File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra
note 262 (distinguishing the claimed gusset from prior art based upon its long tapered sides
which run down the inside of the legs).
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were rejected by the PTO on obviousness grounds.2 4 The PTO
cited as authority the Tanner, Stecker, and Dunning patents.m
The Tanner gusset was a modified common stock gusset incorporated into a nylon garment; however, precisely because the contextlending garment was nylon, the common stock gusset assumed a
round shape.'
The Stecker gusset was the common stock gusset
incorporated into overalls; and, because it conformed to a heavy
denim context-lending garment, the gusset maintained its diamond
shape. 28 7 Finally, the Dunning gusset was the bicycle pants
gusset, which clearly fell outside the public domain because of its
unusual shape.'
In relation to these patents, Polsky's argued
that she was inserting a gusset into a cotton-lycra garment in such
a way that allowed it to retain a true diamond shape, a shape she
hoped to patent.
Again, the PTO rejected Polsky's two independent claims to the
gusset as "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art." 9 But it allowed a claim for a
cotton-lycra exercise pants-like garment that incorporated the
common stock gusset. 2 '
This allowance put Polsky's initial
patent squarely in line with the line of patents that incorporated
the common stock gusset into a patented context-lending gar1
ment.

29

2. Remembering & Forgetting-The 1984 Patent Prosecution.
After Irving B. Smith's 1941 patent, 9 2 no other patent was issued
for gusseted street trousers until 1984, when Bernice Polsky
secured a United States patent for an invention she called "Pants-

'File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (July 15, 1982), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989),
supra note 262 (rejecting claims 1-5).
w Id.

286 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. See also Garrison Interview, supra note
92 (noting two possible reasons for using a circular gusset in nylon garments: for heavier
nylon garments, like girdles, the reason is comfort; and, for lighter nylon garments, like
panty hose, the reason is to prevent the nylon fabric from tearing or running).
" U.S. Patent to Stecker (No. 924,013), supra note 161 and accompanying text.
2m U.S. Patent to Dunning (No. 557,563), supra note 167.
2' See File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (July 15, 1982), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,371,989), supra note 262 (stating that extending Tanner's crotch piece to midway down the
legs would be obvious in light of the Stecker and Dunning patents).
0
" U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note 211.
291 See supra notes 157-189 and accompanying text.
m' U.S. Patent to Smith (No. 2,264,958), supra note 171.
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Like Garments Having a Seamless Crotch Construction."293 The
file wrapper shows that Polsky approached the prosecution of her
1984 patent with a particular strategy in mind.294 First, Polsky's
1984 patent was titled "Pants-like Garments Having a Seamless
Crotch Construction."
Like the title for her 1983 patent--"Seamless Crotch"-this title, though more specific, was
relatively useless in describing or otherwise marking the scope of
what it was that Polsky claimed to have invented. Pants-like
garments having seamless crotch construction had been around
since the 1970s, if not before. 295 Indeed, the pants-like garment
that Polsky referred to was the common, everyday pant. And the
seamless crotch "construction," while suggesting a method or
process, was an ambiguity by which Polsky apparently hoped to
claim ownership to the gusset itself.29 The foundation of Polsky's
1984 strategy, then, was to present two independent claims for a
pants-like garment that incorporated the common stock gusset.
This was the ground upon which the PTO had allowed her 1983
patent.297
The 1984 Polsky patent made eighteen dependent claims related
to the gusset. These claims described the gusset in terms that had
been used before. 29' Like early twentieth century patents, rather
than simply referring to the gusset, Polsky's dependent claims
described it in full detail.299
Moreover, while it was accurate to say that the PTO had not yet
allowed claims for patenting conventional pants with a common
stock gusset, it was not accurate to say that there was an absence
of prior art for such a garment.3" As discussed above, as early

U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,48S,317), supra note 212.
' File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra note 262.
See supra notes 113-155 and accompanying text (discussing development of the gusset
before, through, and after the 1970s).
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (noting that processes are patentable).
See U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note 211 (granting a patent for cotton
and lycra spandex garment suitable for athletic activities).
See File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra
note 262 (describing the design with terms such as "form fitting," "crotch piece," and
"seamless crotch").
2 Id.
3m See supra notes 113-189 and accompanying text (discussing prior gusset related
patents).
20
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as 1902, the Sears, Roebuck Company had manufactured an
augmented garment that, though not identical, anticipated Polsky's
independent claims in all salient respects, 30 1 as did the bib
overalls of the 1940s, °2 and the Lee Dude Ranch Jean with the
"famous u-crotch" of the same era. 0 3 In the early 1970s, Stacy
Kuranz had marketed the Movement Pants,3 0 4 and in the late
1970s, Century had manufactured the Kickin' Jeans. 0 5 Both of
these embodiments anticipated the Polsky invention in all respects.3 ° These embodiments found their way to the market well
before Polsky's second patent. Thus, off-record prior art, which
Polsky had the duty to discover and disclose to the PTO,30 7 had
not been disclosed and, for that reason alone, was not considered
by the Patent Examiner in the prosecution of the 1984 patent.0 8
Had such off-record prior art been considered, the Patent Examiner
would have been statutorily mandated to deny the 1984 Polsky
patent.0 9
In addition to this anticipating off-record prior art, there was also
on-record prior art that anticipated the incorporation of the
common stock gusset into street garments.1 0 Irving B. Smith's
patent for expandable trousers, described above, despite the near
silly incorporation of buttons and zippers, marked an important

30' See White v. Lombardy Dresses, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); White v.
Lombardy Dresses, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (collectively holding that in the area
of clothing design, prior art need only read on in salient respects).
302 See supra note 126 (giving examples of gusset-using bib overall manufacturers).
"' See supra note 127 (depicting the Lee "Dude Ranch Jean").
See supra note 143 (discussing Kuranz's statement that she got the idea for her
Movement Pants design in the early 1970s).
sM See supra note 151 (showing a Kickin' Jeans advertisement).
s See supra notes 143-151 (discussing the re-entry of gusseted pants into the American
market).
mo See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (describing specification requirements which must
accompany patent applications); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996) (describing the duty to disclose
information material to patentability); Gary M. Hoffman & Mark J. Thronson, Standardof
Care Established in Intellectual PropertyLaw Opinions, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1993, at 1
(discussing the duty and standard of care individual intellectual property attorneys have in
advising clients, especially duties related to the exhaustiveness of the search for prior art.).
So File Wrapper, Patent Application, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra note
262.
39
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-i93 (1994).
310 See supra note 44 (discussing the White v. Lombardy line of cases rejecting patents on
dress designs for lack of innovativeness).
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moment in the twentieth century life of the gusset. 3n Smith's
pants were clearly a novelty item, but because of the historical
moment in which they appeared, they were directed at the
everyday market. Smith secured his patent in 1941, just as United
States was entering World War II. The text of Smith's patent
describes an article of clothing in which one could zip up the
gussets by day, and release them by night when "reclining or
lounging or sleeping." "'
Smith's text conjured up images of
young men on their way to war, spending long nights in transit. It
exuded in equal doses a sense of American pragmatism and
common cause in the sense that expandable trousers were Smith's
admittedly small and untested, but optimistic contribution to the
war effort. 33
To be sure, Smith's patent was squarely in line with other
patents treating the gusset as an obscure, peripheral item recycled
from the common stock.31 4 But minus the buttons and zippers,
Smith's design boiled down to a pair of street pants with a gusset.
If the gusset had been forgotten in everyday wear, which off-record
prior art proves it had not been, then Smith's 1941 patent serves
as the precise moment at which the gusset reemerges in the
collective awareness, at least as that awareness is recorded by the

PTO.
3. BureaucraticDecisionmaking-The 1987 Patent Prosecution.
Invention is a process that builds on what came before, but there
are more original and less original ways to go about the building.31 5 Of Polsky's three patents, the 1987 patent is the most
difficult to analyze. This is because Polsky took the less original
route.
all See U.S. Patent to Smith (No. 2,264,958), supra note 171 (claiming pants incorporating
a detachable concealable gusset).
3s2 Id at 1.

"i See Selznick, supra note 196 (discussing the analytical importance of American

Pragmatism
at this time and in general).
14
, See SUpra Part II.C.2 (discussing patents incorporating the gusset into their design).
." "[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea." Litman, supra note
109, at 966. "Invention is rarely a completely discrete or fortuitous occurrence; rather,
inventors constantly engage in the process of adapting, re-evaluating and transforming what
is already 'out there' in some other form." Otieno-Odek, supra note 110, at 17 (citing Litman,
supra note 108, at 967. See also Aoki, supra note 14, at 25 (noting other scholars who have
discredited the idea of "romantic [individualistic] authorship").
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When Polsky applied for her third patent on April 3, 1987, she
also filed an "Information Disclosure Statement" as required under
37 C.F.R. § 1.56.316 This statement disclosed Polsky's prior
patents and the West3 17 line of patents, but it did not mention the
off-record prior art, whose disclosure was also statutorily required. 311 Moreover, this off-record prior art was art that Polsky
had actual notice of during the prosecution of her third patent.3" 9
Nevertheless, in the Information Disclosure Statement, Polsky
averred that the patents she cited in her application "constitu[ted]
320
the closest art of which Applicant [Polsky] is aware.
Initially, all twenty of Polsky's 1987 claims, six of which were
independent claims, were rejected by the PTO on the ground that
they failed under the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, to provide
a "written description of the invention ... in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains ... to make and use the same . .
The
'""

File Wrapper, Information Disclosure Statement, U.S.

Patent to Polsky (No.

4,785,480), supra note 262. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires specification of prior art in accord with
37 CFR § 1.56, which requires disclosure of information material to the examination of the
application. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 115 provides that "the
applicant shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of
[that]... for which he solicits a patent.' Id. § 115. Although Polsky may still have believed
herself the "original and first inventor" of the No-Bind Pants with Seamless Crotch, it would
seem apparent that the information she acquired from Kuranz during her deposition would
have been material to the examination of the Polsky application and, therefore, subject to
the rule of disclosure. See also Buzzelli v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 521 F.2d 1162, 186
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that when an applicant had failed to disclose
clearly material prior art and asserted that no such art existed, that conduct rendered the
patent unenforceable).
317 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the 1891 patent issued to
Marshall 0. West for "Drawers*).
318 See supra note 319 (noting that Chi Concepts sent copies of its design to Polsky).
"' Chi Concepts sent its embodied designs to Polsky's attorney as part of discovery.
Ostrow Interview, supra note 203. See also Correspondence from the law firm of Harris,
Kern, Wallen and Tinsley on behalf of Polsky to Ostrow (Jan. 6, 1987) (on file with Author)
(confirming "the patterns were sent to Ms. Polsky on 23 December 1986). In terms of an
easily referenced time line, Polsky's original application was rejected on Feb. 25, 1988,
Kuranz's deposition was taken on April 20, 1988, Polsky filed her final claims on May 31,
1988, and her final drawings on June 6, 1988, and the patent was issued on Aug. 24, 1988.
File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 262.
320 File Wrapper, Information Disclosure Statement, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,785,480), supra note 262.
" File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (Feb. 25, 1988), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480),
supra note 262 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 and other grounds, specifically 35 U.S.C. § 102(e),
prior art).
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PTO issued notice of its rejection on February 25, 1988; under the
terms of this notice, Polsky had three months to submit more
detailed claims. 3"
Meanwhile, Polsky had notified the PTO of her law suit against
Chi Concepts, Inc., in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 290. 323 The
complaint charged Chi Concepts with infringement related to the
1983 and 1984 Polsky patents. This complaint was soon dismissed
without prejudice.3 24 However, in an effort to trace its claim of
right to the gusset, Chi Concepts deposed Kuranz on April 20,
1988, two months after the PTO rejected Polsky's initial claims for
lack of specificity. 3 25 At the deposition Polsky's attorney requested copies of Kuranz's pattern.3 26 In addition, Polsky acquired
access to Movement Pants drawings and Chi Concepts' embodied
designs. 27
By May 31, 1988, apparently after reviewing Kuranz's deposition
testimony, the Movement Pants drawings, and Chi Concepts'
embodied designs, Polsky was able to submit a more detailed
description of her invention to the PTO. s Whereas the rejected
claims had used general language--curves were "slight" and points
faced "the front center of the garment" 3 -the revised claims
were specific. To give two randomly selected examples, "slight

maId.
n 35 U.S.C. § 290 (1994).

' File Wrapper, Report on the Filing or Determination of an Action Regarding a Patent
(May 16, 1988), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 262.

See supra notes 143-152 and accompanying text (discussing the reappearance of the
gusset in the American market through Kuranz's Movement Pants and license to Chi
Concepts).
' It was decided at the deposition that Polsky's attorney, Ms. Finkel, could contact Me.
Kuranz for her original design. Deposition of Kuranz, supra note 143, at 158-159. However,

Kuranz was not contacted by Ms. Finkel after the deposition, nor did she send patterns to
Ms. Finkel's office. Kuranz Interview, supra note 145.
27 Deposition of Kuranz, supra note 143.
While Polsky did not procure Kuranz's
patterns, she did receive Ostrow's patterns. See supra note 319. In addition Polsky had
access to the Kuranz Movement Pants garment tags, which pictured the pants, and to the
pants themselves. See supra note 143. Pattern maker Victoria Garrison has confirmed that
in order to copy a design, all one needs is the garment and a measuring tape. Garrison
Interview, supra note 92.
2 File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 262.
File Wrapper, Original Patent Application (Apr. 3, 1987), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,785.480), supra note 262.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/2

62

Carrillo: Protecting a Piece of American Folklore: The Example of the Gusse

1997]

AMERICAN FOLKLORE

265

curves" 33 became "convexly curved outer edges that extended
from the waistband edge down buttocks, outer thigh and leg
segments", 1 and points facing the "front center of the garment"
became "front edges meeting at a first point toward the front center
of the garment below the waistline."3 2 Citing two distinct patent
lines, Polsky positioned her invention as one that was either "a
combination of "a conventional garment (trousers) with a gusset, or
alternatively, an entirely novel garment (innovative pants with an
innovative gusset--"innovative" from Polsky's perspective).'
Yet, whereas her initial application offered only a general description of pants, her later description, compiled after access to
Kuranz's and ChiPants' combined knowledge and designs, offered
information specific enough to be adjudged of use to a person of
ordinary skill in the trade.334
Equally problematic was that even though Polsky was prosecuting her patent at the same time that she was gathering
discovery information from ChiPants, she failed to disclose the
Kuranz line of prior art to the PTO. 5 Polsky had notice of this
line as early as July 16, 1987, the date of ChiPants' answer to her
complaint."6 She certainly had first hand awareness and knowledge of this line by April 20, 1988, the date of Kuranz's deposition.33 7 None of this prior art came to the PTO's attention during
the Polsky patent prosecution of 1987 and 1988.m
Finally,
Polsky's third patent represented a return to her initial 1983
strategy. This strategy had already been rejected by the PTO,
therefore Polsky should have been estopped from attempting to
recapture claims about the gusset that she had previously surrendered.339
no0 Id,
File Wrapper, Revised Patent Application (May 31, 1988), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,785,480), supra note 262.

Id.
aId.
3" 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
a See File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 262.

asId.
See Deposition of Kuranz, supra note 143 (recording Polsky's presence at the
deposition).
"'
File Wrapper, U.S. patent to Polsky (480), supra note 214.

35 U.S.C. § 112. Under the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, Polsky would be
estopped from claiming the gusset itself either under her first (No. 4,371,989) or second (No.
4,488,317) patent, and perhaps also under her third (No. 4,785,480) patent since she
previously surrendered her broad claims vis A vis the gusset during prosecution of her
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C. MEANINGS: GENERALIZING FROM THE POLSKY SERIES

Examining the evolution of the Polsky series makes her invention
"process" fairly apparent. It was the kind of process whereby
Polsky gathered the various patents issued to garments incorporating gussets, and based on these drawings and descriptions alone,
she attempted to imagine an abstract innovation to the line. It was
deriving sentences from sentences as a matter of strict logic, or in
this case, deriving ideas from ideas as a matter of strict logic.3'
Not copyrightable as a matter of substantive law, Polsky's 1987
patent application was granted primarily on procedural grounds;
the PTO's scrutiny ended when Polsky filed a more specific
description of her claim, whereas it should have just commenced at
that point with an inquiry into obviousness.3"
More specifically, Polsky's invention process was to aggregate and
recombine the written descriptions of the common stock gusset that
she had found in patent records. The foundation for this process
was her mistaken belief that the aggregation itself constituted an
"improvement" to the art. 2 The PTO did not accede to this style
of invention; at each point in the prosecution of the three Polsky
patents, when Polsky attempted to claim a proprietary interest to
the gusset qua gusset, the patent examiner rejected her efforts. 3
It was only after Polsky had the opportunity to study actual
designs with historical market success that Polsky's claims to the
gusset took on legitimacy.
Unfortunately, all of this subtlety was lost on Polsky. Despite
the patent prosecution process of 1983, which forbade her from

applications before the PTO. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (1997)

(describing the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel).
' See Selznick, supra note 196, at 39-62 (discussing the intellectual tenor that gives rise
to "invention" as a matter of logic alone, rather than logic as modified by experience).
m1 See supra notes 315-339 and accompanying text (noting that the patent was granted
after a request for specificity was met).
m2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
s' File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (July 15, 1982), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989),
supra note 262; File Wrapper, Examiner's Action (Feb. 25, 1988), U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,785,480), supra note 262. In the application for her Second patent, Polsky claimed the
entire pants embodying a gusset (and not the gusset alone). Despite the fact that the
"innovative" aspect of the pants was the use of the described gusset, the PTO allowed her
claims. File Wrapper, U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,488,317), supra note 262.
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claiming the gusset qua gusset, despite her failure to adequately
research the prior art for her 1984 patent prosecution process, and
despite her failure to disclose the prior art that she had full
knowledge of during the 1987-1988 patent prosecution process,
Polsky continued to believe that she had "birthed this creation,"
meaning that she had invented the gusset.'
She argued that
she had based her invention on "12 years of real research and
development in the dance studios in Canada," where she said that
she "designed and personally sewed each garment" she ever
made.'
In addition, Polsky's attorney continued to write cease
and desist letters as late as 1995 on the ground that Polsky owned
"the seamless crotch," the gusset. 6
In all likelihood, Polsky's first U.S. patent was probably valid.
However, her second and third U.S. patents should not have been
granted. The second was clearly anticipated by off-record prior art
and arguably by recorded prior art, as was the third. The third
also violated principles of file wrapper estoppel,34 7 despite having
been approved after incomplete disclosure. Yet that patent was
granted, giving it the presumption of validity, as well as encourag34
ing Polsky to travel the world in search of foreign patents. '
This meant, of course, that the task of rebutting the presumption
of validity, either through market or judicial processes, was left to
other manufacturers.
In fairness, it may have been difficult for Polsky-a small scale
actor-to find prior art of the sort presented in Part II of this
Article, especially if her research efforts were limited to experiential modes.3 9 However, she had no excuse for failing to disclose
Kuranz's Movement Pants, for which she had actual know-

Correspondence from Polsky to Ostrow (Sep. 18, 1995) (on file with author).
'Id.
'"Correspondence from the law firm of Rosner, Owens & Nunziato on behalf of Polsky
to ChiPants (Jul. 11, 1995) (on file with author).
'" See supra note 339.
"By 1995 Polsky had secured patents for gusseted pants in Germany (#G-89-03-018.4),
Canada (#1,222,104), Taiwan (#27768), Australia (#590488), New Zealand (#227198), and
Spain (#8900508/2). Correspondence from Polsky to Ostrow, supra note 344.
"9Polsky based her claim to the gusset on "12 years of real research and development
in the dance studios in Canada." Id.
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ledge,3 5 ° or Century's Kickin' Jeans, a garment she could have
discovered in a prior art search. As a patent applicant, Polsky had
the duty to fully disclose the prior art-a duty that she acknowledged with an oath. 31 1 Nevertheless, Polsky continued to assert
that the responsibilities ran in the opposite direction, and that it
was the PTO's responsibility as a protector of the public interest to
research and disclose prior art.3 2 When presented with evidence
of the gusset
as a public domain item, Polsky responded with
3 1"
disbelief.
In conclusion, the bureaucratic processes described herein led to
the first point in American history where manufacturers had to
either seek a single individual's permission to use the gusset or else
risk a lawsuit. Manufacturers who were otherwise in tune with the
PTO's function in their industry, called its actions in this case into
question.3 5 ' If they produced without first licensing with Polsky,
they opened their own businesses up to risk as well as the businesses of their contractors. 355 In one case, Polsky even sent cease
and desist letters to AONET, the on-line service provider for ChiPants.35 6 Her letter threatened to sue AONET for contributory
infringement on the ground that it was reproducing images of the
gusset on the worldwide web.35 7

3
moSee supra notes 315-339 and accompanying text (discussing Polsky's knowledge of and
access to Kuranz's designs).
351 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996). See also supra notes 316-320 (discussing applicant's duty of

disclosure).
' Correspondence from Polsky to Ostrow, supra note 344.
W3Id.

' In January 1996 an informal gathering of garment manufacturers convened in San
Francisco, California to discuss how best to address Polsky's demand for licensing fees of
between $30,000 and $80,000 per manufacturer for use of "her" gusset. Because of the
prohibitive cost of patent litigation, Polsky's threats were problematic. For example, Chi
Concepts, Inc. spent close to $80,000 in the 1980's simply to defend against Polsky's first
complaint, which was dismissed in the discovery phase. Ostrow Interview, supra note 203.
' Correspondence from Polsky to Jaron (Jan. 23, 1996) (on file with author) (informing
Jaron that Polsky had mailed ChiPants a cease and desist letter and implying that Jaron
ought to cease manufacturing activities in order to avoid potential liability).

"Correspondence

from Polsky to AONET Service Provider representative Roger Clay

(Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with author).
357 Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The gusset is a humble thing. Nevertheless, it is a common pool
resource. Evidence shows that manufacturers and designers have
treated the gusset as a common pool resource in the twentieth
Congress consistently declines to extend copyright
century.
protection to embodied clothing design. And although patent
protection is available for innovative clothing designs, securing
patent protection requires that one have a novel design-indeed,
one novel enough, as a practical matter, to make the long, arduous
patent process worthwhile.
Proponents and critics of the public domain, while advancing the
debate in law review literature about how the commons ought to be
governed, have perhaps fallen into the common pool resources
trap.3" These policy discussions, because they are not founded
in empirical research, too often use the idea of the commons as a
metaphor.3 5 9 Those in favor of a policy recognizing the commons
see federal protection (typically through either collectivization or
regulation) as the only way to protect that metaphorical space and
Those against such a policy see
the things or ideas in it. 3"
privatization as the only way to protect what is at stake." 1
Empirical research of how these common pool resources are
actually treated clearly identifies and acknowledges the existence
of commons in local contexts and identifies other explanatory
alternatives that are consistent with the ones identified in this
Article as subjects for further research.6 2
The garment industry has consistently and confidently treated
the gusset as a common pool resource. It was a design, available
to all, interpretable by all, and clearly outside the parameters of
the copyright regime. The problem arose, however, because the

"' See, e.g., supra notes 240-254 (discussing the main strains of scholarly disagreement
regarding the public domain).
' OSTROM, supranote 256 (stressing the importance of empirical work as the foundation
for theory building in this area).
moSee supra notes 240-250 and accompanying text (discussing viewpoints of how scholars
equalize privatization with diminishment of the public domain).
3 See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 10.
See OSTROM, supra note 256 (arguing that empirical evidence of how actors actually
treat common pool resources is overlooked and should be used as a foundation for theory
building).
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gusset could be incorporated into patented garments. This was
possible given the federal policy to grant patent monopolies to novel
designs, even if those designs incorporated common stock aspects,
like the gusset. To work properly this policy relied entirely on the
patentee to distinguish between what was novel and what was
"borrowed" from the public domain. The policy was implemented
by more specific rules about the importance of full disclosure by the
patentee to the PTO.
In this case, while the PTO's process of distinguishing between
new and old ("borrowed" from the commons) worked in the first two
patents of the Polsky series, despite the lack of full disclosure on
the patentee's part,3 it arguably failed in the third patent
(ironically because of the lack of full disclosure on the patentee's
part).3 " Principals in the garment industry responded to the
third patent in the Polsky series by asserting something that the
policy literature typically fails to consider-that government
bureaucracies, like the PTO, make mistakes. Here, the principals
took the stance that the PTO had made a mistake.
Thus, as the patentee proceeded to exploit the PTO's mistake by
threatening infringement law suits, a small group of principals
came together to consider what their response would and should be.
This small group eventually grew to include principals from other
arenas as well-arenas peopled by venture capitalists, internet
service providers, retailers, contractors, designers, fabric producers,
and even cotton growers-all of whom tentatively came together in
a loose, self-organized, self-governing incipient "institution" to
protect their access to the gusset design. Had these principals been
acting with an eye toward law review literature on the intellectual
property commons, they would have either appealed to the state to
collectivize (or better regulate) the resource, or they would have
gone along with what was essentially the privatization of the
resource. Instead, they reached for an alternative solution of the
sort that empirical data reveals as well. Presuming (a) that the
PTO had made a mistake in its regulation of the gusset by granting
a patent, and (b) that the mistake had unwittingly led to the

' U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,371,989), supra note 211; U.S. Patent to Polsky (No.
4,488,317), supra note 212.
' U.S. Patent to Polsky (No. 4,785,480), supra note 214.
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presumption that the gusset was a privately ownable design, the
principals responded by cooperating vis Avis the resource, and thus
countering privatization by treating the gusset as a publicly owned
item, or common pool resource. Their cooperation was limited,
however, by the understanding that "privatization" could be had, if
necessary, through the doctrine of trade dress, which allows
garment producers to develop and own an image. 3 '
How the principals set up their self-organized, self-governing,
incipient institution is a subject for further study. So is whether
they will reach an optimal way to manage the common resource of
the gusset design. However, before that study of unofficial
institution building and maintaining can be done, the common pool
resource itself must be identified-in this case, that common pool
resource is also a little piece of American (material) folklore, the
gusset. This Article tries to identify and understand this resource,
recognizing that, because it is intangible (the gusset being essentially a design idea), and because it is a commonly used item with
a long and complicated history, the boundaries and accessibility of
this "commons," though not defined by law, are made visible by
contextualized discussions of law.

3"

See supra note 24 (noting that the doctrine of trade dress would allow for the

ownership of image, which would be roughly equivalent to the drawing off of "resource units"
from a tangible commons).
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